

Negotiations 1990 Edition (Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990).

3. See *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective*, Chapter Two, especially pp. 22-23.

4. The exact status of "associated measures" went unremarked at the time of the original study and is still unclear. It is true that NATO officials generally thought of these measures as being "CBMs by another name" when they were first proposed. However, their real purpose was not necessarily consistent with confidence building as we understand it today, being too much intended to achieve *unilateral advantage* as part of the larger MBFR negotiating process. The intention to achieve unilateral advantage seems inconsistent with our developing sense of what confidence building is about although this would not have been at all obvious at the time. This status issue — are associated measures CBMs? — is quite difficult and requires further study. No final assessment is proposed here and the status of associated measures is considered ambiguous.

The MBFR negotiations also are important for an entirely separate reason. It has been suggested that the MBFR negotiations were important because they permitted NATO and WTO officials to interact on both official and (especially) unofficial or informal levels. This insight eventually helped inform the underlying logic of the transformation approach although the importance of interaction alone has recently come into question. This point is explored in Chapter Four.

5. After twelve years, it is still not entirely clear how declaratory undertakings ought to be treated. Should they be considered a distinct functional category of confidence building measure, co-equal with information and constraint? It is true that they could be seen to have a genuine, positive impact on the confidence building process in some cases. However, these sorts of measures can also be completely hollow, proposed cynically for purposes of very specific political gain or to materially disadvantage an adversary. The experience of the CSCE prior to the conclusion of the Stockholm Document in 1986 certainly encourages a sceptical view but we should probably retain a relatively open mind on this issue for the time being. It might be most constructive to exclude them from consideration as true CBMs. At the same time, it would be prudent to recognize that

in some contexts (i.e., non-Western European political cultures), they *may* play a more direct and positive causal role in contributing to a transformation process. Equally, they may prove to be meaningless.

From the CSCE/OSCE perspective, timing would appear to be central to understanding the nature and status of declaratory measures. From this perspective, declaratory measures — particularly, sweeping ones — proposed in the early stages of a developing security relationship are not likely to be intended as genuine confidence building measures. They probably will precede the actual initiation of a transformation process and therefore cannot contribute to it. Indeed, they are more likely to undermine it if no threat perception change has begun to develop. *If* they are proposed later in the confidence building process, once a process of transformation is manifest, then they may be able to play a constructive role.

6. In outline, the typology of CBMs developed twelve years ago included the following categories:

- (A) **Information and Communication CBMs**
 - (1) Information Measures (the exchange and publication of technical information about military forces and activities);
 - (2) Communication Measures (the provision for direct exchanges of information);
 - (3) Notification Measures (the timely announcement of military manoeuvres and movements beyond a certain size or character);
 - (4) Manoeuvre Observer Conduct Measures (rules for treating observers at manoeuvres as well as rules for the conduct of observers);
- (B) **Constraint and Surprise Attack Measures**
 - (1) Inspection Measures (provision for the inspection of specified military activities and forces);
 - (2) Non-Interference Measures (provisions to facilitate verification);
 - (3) Behavioral or Tension-Reducing Measures (limits on provocative military activities);
 - (4) Deployment Constraint Measures (limits on equipment and personnel deployment in sensitive areas).

See p. 65, *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process*. Chapter Six of the original study includes a comprehensive list of proposals