

weapons. Moreover, this burden has been disproportionately borne by populations in less developed countries. It is the most disadvantaged peoples who are suffering the most today - and UNSSOD III should not lose sight of this central fact.

It is in this area that regional approaches to arms control and disarmament may well have the highest dividends. It is encouraging that the States of the two major military alliances, within the framework of the CSCE process, seem about to enter formal negotiations aimed at maintaining stability at lower levels of conventional armament in Europe. Other States should consider actively the possibilities for negotiated limitations and reductions of conventional arms at a regional level, on the basis of the undiminished security of all States and with full respect for the security interests and independence of States outside military alliances.

The 1987 Conference on Disarmament and Development was a landmark event in that it registered unequivocally a more sophisticated international understanding of the complex and multi-dimensional nature of security. More specifically, it was agreed that disarmament and development are two distinct processes, each of which contributes to enhanced security and in turn benefits from it. It is important that the autonomy of these processes be preserved. Canadian policies and programmes are based firmly on the view that disarmament and development must each be pursued in its own right.

The international arms control and disarmament process has witnessed growing acceptance that effective verification provisions are an essential element of arms control agreements. The insistence on adequate verification provisions is no longer automatically seen suspiciously as an "excuse" for failure to conclude agreements. Rather, it is acknowledged as the necessary means for attaining confidence in compliance. This in turn reflects an understanding that the need for assured compliance with agreements which touch directly on the vital security interests of States is fundamental.

The broadened acceptance of the legitimacy of the requirement for effective verification has been resoundingly registered in the recent work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. After concentrated work at two sessions, the Commission successfully "reported out" on this agenda item. Canada is particularly proud to have chaired the Working Group. The co-operative and reasoned approaches by countries from all regions and political groups was essential to this achievement.

We hope that this special session will readily agree on the desirability of giving its endorsement to the outcome by incorporating the agreed 16 verification principles into our concluding document.

The United Nations must play an effective role in the multilateral arms control process, including through developing a capacity to contribute to the effective verification of multilateral agreements. In this context, the recent work of the UNDC should be seen as only the first stage, not the conclusion of international co-operation within the United Nations framework on the development of effective multilateral verification arrangements.