

borne, could fall upon one column before the other could come up; or, in other words, oppose the mass of their army to the fractions of ours. This was what actually happened afterwards by the activity of the Fenian leaders.

Again, if the idea were to prevent them getting away, it is to be remembered that Col. Peacock's duty was to protect the Welland Canal, to drive them out of the country and to confine their depredations to as small a compass as possible. And it must be also remembered that if their retreat was cut off from the Niagara river, they would certainly endeavour to retreat some other way, and the road being open to the Welland Canal, they would make a dash for it, and seizing some of the numerous vessels which are always to be found upon it, they could embark and make their escape even if they did not delay long enough to destroy some of the locks on the canal. Taking all these points into consideration, there is no doubt that this plan was very injudicious, and not calculated to effect the end Col. Peacock was ordered to keep in view.

2nd. Another plan would have been to have concentrated his whole force at Chippawa, Port Colborne, or Port Robinson; but this was not advisable, as by doing so he would have uncovered some of those places.

3rd. A third plan, and the one which he adopted, was to unite his forces from Port Colborne and Chippawa at some point midway between those places, and from there march united upon the Fenians. On looking at his map, Stevensville was the only place marked upon it at which they could unite. It was well chosen for the purpose; it was about ten miles from Chippawa, about thirteen miles from Port Colborne, and about ten miles from Fort Erie. If Colonel Peacock had his forces united at Stevensville, he was in a position to prevent their march towards Chippawa as well as towards Port Colborne, and would be able to fall upon them in full force whichever road they took; at the same time his position there would have thoroughly protected the Welland Canal.

In order to carry out this plan, he telegraphed for all his reinforcements to push on and join him at Chippawa, ordering them at the same time to bring provisions with them in their haversacks, so that there should be no delay in breakfasting. In order to prevent the Fenians, as far as possible, from receiving reinforcements, or from escaping, if so inclined, he telegraphed to Port Colborne to Lieut.-Col. Dennis (Lt.-Col. Booker not having arrived at this time) directing him to place a detachment on board the International Ferry Boat which he had ordered round from Buffalo, and to send it down to Fort Erie to patrol the river and prevent reinforcements coming over, or the Fenians from escaping. Lt.-Col. Dennis, finding that the International ferry boat was not crossing, telegraphed to Dunnville for the tug "Robb," owned by Capt. McCallum to come down.

Colonel Peacock then made arrangements for the junction of his forces with Lieut. Col. Booker's. At the time he decided on the hour of meeting, the greater portion of his force was yet to arrive, and not knowing at what hour in the night or in the morning they might come in, he was unable to name an earlier hour to start than 6 a.m., which would make his hour of arrival at Stevensville between 10 and 11 a.m. Not having a map showing the roads about Port Colborne and between there and Stevensville, and being unable in Chippawa to obtain accurate information of the roads or the condition of them, and having received at the

same time very conflicting information as to the movements of the enemy, he found that it was impossible for him to lay down the route which Lieut. Col. Booker should take, or the hour at which he should start in order to meet him at Stevensville between 10 and 11 a.m. Under these circumstances he thought it desirable to send an officer across the country to Lieut.-Col. Booker who should be thoroughly acquainted with his plan, and would be able, in case of doubt or difficulty, to consult with Lieut.-Colonel Booker, and see that the spirit of the plan was carried out even if the details were varied.

Acting upon this idea, Col. Peacock chose Capt. Akers, R.E. for this service, and explained his plan and the reasons which induced him to adopt it, and explained to him that he wished the junction to take place at Stevensville, between 10 and 11 a.m.; but, with reference to the roads, he left it entirely optional with Lieut.-Col. Booker and Capt. Akers to choose a road after making thorough enquiries as to the most available route, and the route most remote from the position of the enemy—going even so far as to tell Capt. Akers that they might go along the Welland Railway, northerly, to a point opposite Stevensville, and then march due East to Stevensville; or take the Grand Trunk Railway for some miles and then cut across the country in a diagonal direction to the point of junction. Ridgeway was never mentioned as a point to leave the railway; and there is little doubt that, with a correct map, Col. Peacock would have positively forbidden it—Ridgeway being nearer Fort Erie than Stevensville, and the further march being, consequently, brought nearer to the enemy's position than the occasion called for. From information obtained since there is no doubt that the shortest and safest road lay from Sherk's Crossing across country to Stevensville.

We will now leave Col. Peacock in Chippawa, listening to the reports of scouts, and farmers coming in, and obtaining information as to the roads, etc., and follow Capt. Akers to Port Colborne, and describe what happened there and how the plan of campaign was carried out.

We must go back a little, in the order of our story, and give an account of what happened at Port Colborne, until the arrival of Capt. Akers. It will be remembered that Lieut.-Col. Dennis was sent there, on the morning of Friday, with 400 men of the Queen's Own, and directed to occupy and, if necessary, entrench a position there and wait for further orders before an attack was made. He arrived at Port Colborne about noon, and hearing the enemy were not very near the village, billeted the men to enable them to get their dinners, and sent out scouts during the afternoon to discover the position of the Fenians. The day and evening was occupied in this way; no attempt whatever at entrenching having been made. In the evening, about 11 p.m., Lieut.-Col. Booker arrived with his battalion, the 13th of Hamilton, and being the senior officer, took command of the whole force.

At 10 p.m., Mr. Graham the Collector of Customs at Fort Erie, arrived with information of the exact position of the Fenian camp. This was on Frenchman's Creek, a mile below the lower ferry, on Mr. Newbigging's farm. He had been in their camp at six o'clock that evening, and was of opinion that there were not more than 700 men, and that as they had been drinking hard during the day, they would certainly fall an easy prey to any force that might attack them. Lt.-Col. Dennis' orders were positive not to attack until further orders—the same orders

were binding on Lieut.-Col. Booker—and consequently, they could not properly move to the attack which Mr. Graham urged them to make, and which he stated would certainly be successful. In order to induce them to move at once to attack, he suggested that, probably Col. Peacock was endeavouring to keep the Volunteers back in order that the regulars should have all the credit of capturing the Fenians.

This reasoning, and the prospect of success, was too much for Lieut.-Col. Dennis. Col. Dennis is a volunteer officer who for a year commanded the Toronto Field Battery; and, on leaving that, was appointed Brigade Major. When the Military School was first organized, he obtained a first class certificate; and, at the camp at Laprairie, was appointed a Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General; but at no time did the officers of the force look upon him as a good drill; although as an office man in the position of Brigade Major, no one could do the duty better. He knew nothing of military science or of the different branches of the art of war. He is possessed of an exceedingly sanguine and enthusiastic temperament; never thinks of defeat; is rather visionary in his plans, and never provides against disaster. He is not deficient in pluck but has not that sound, cautious judgment which is absolutely necessary in a man holding a responsible command in the field.

(To be continued.)

The following proclamation appears in the Red River organ, the *New Nation*, of the 23rd of July:

To the Loyal Inhabitants of Manitoba:

Her Majesty's Government having determined upon stationing some troops amongst you, I have been instructed by the Lieutenant-General commanding in British North America to proceed to Fort Garry with a force under my command. Our mission is one of peace, and the sole object of the Expedition is to secure Her Majesty's sovereign authority.

Courts of law, such as are common to every portion of Her Majesty's empire, will be duly established, and justice will be impartially administered to all races and classes; loyal Indians and half-breeds being as dear to the Queen as any other of her loyal subjects.

The force which I have the honor of commanding will enter your Province, representing no party in religion or politics, and will afford equal protection to the lives and property of all races and of all creeds. The strictest order of discipline will be maintained, and private property will be carefully respected.

All supplies furnished by the inhabitants to the troops will be duly paid for. Should any one consider himself injured by any individual attached to the forces, his grievance shall be promptly inquired into.

All loyal people are earnestly invited to aid me in carrying out the above mentioned objects

(Signed,) G. L. WOLSELEY.



CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT,

OTTAWA, Aug. 12, 1870.

AUTHORIZED DISCOUNT ON AMERICAN INVOICES until further notice, 15 per cent.

R. S. M. BOUCHETTE,
Commissioner of Customs,