

of states that become fully bound by their provisions. The possibility of establishing such zones in various parts of the world has been the subject of numerous United Nations resolutions in recent years. Yet, apart from the Antarctic, Latin America is the only area of the world that has been established as a nuclear-weapon-free zone by treaty — and that treaty is still not in force for some important countries of the region. Moreover, its protocols have yet to be adopted by all the states to which they were designed to apply.

#### Necessary support

The value of any specific nuclear-weapon-free-zone proposal or arrangement depends, however, on whether it has, or is likely to have, the support of most countries of the area concerned, including the major military powers of the region. It also depends on a nuclear definition of the geographic area covered, and assurance that no additional military advantage is conferred on any state or group of states. There must also be provision for ensuring full compliance with the commitments involved and forswearing the independent acquisition of nuclear-explosive capability. Supplementary arrangements applicable to states outside the region must be

realistic and consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. These are only some of the pressing problems of arms control. There are others. The mammoth proportion of the international arms trade continues to devour vast resources urgently needed for productive economic and social development throughout the world. Concerted international action is urgently required to check both suppliers and recipients to curb the growth in the arms trade. Progress has been slow in the MBFR negotiations which are now about to enter their second year with little measurable achievement yet in sight. There is a glimmer of hope for a treaty to prohibit chemical weapons but difficult verification problems remain to be overcome. No more time must be lost in seeking solutions to these problems. As the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs said in the UN General Assembly on September 29, 1976, "States must re-examine their traditional assumptions, take adequate account of the security concerns of others and avail all opportunities for concrete action. It is the spirit that must guide states in a special session of the UN on disarmament that is expected to take place in 1978."

### Disarmament

# The achievement of parity in the strategic balance

By C. R. Jacobsen

In today's strategic environment, the U.S.S.R. has reached something akin to parity with the U.S.A. Through the early 1960s, Moscow had concentrated on securing the survival of its as yet limited strategic potential: it built reinforced silos, experimented with mobile missiles and with ballistic-missile defence (BMD), began to move a portion of its missile force to sea, and, finally, succeeded in greatly improving its command and control systems. By the mid 1960s, the Soviet Union might be said for the first time to have acquired a secure "second-strike" force deterrent. It then proceeded through the

late Sixties and early Seventies with the quantitative building priority aimed at matching the larger panoply of their strategic arsenal, with its resulting flexibility of options.

The program initiated in 1961 to build a strategic navy with a global reach proceeded apace. By 1970, emerging capabilities were demonstrated in the first coordinated world-wide exercise "Okean". By the mid-1970s, one saw the initial deployment of the 4,000 to 5,000-mile SLBMs, submarine-launched missiles which could be fired from coastal waters as well as from the (in any case marginal)