classic example of this type of approach was the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. The parties to it, which included all the major powers of the time, renounced war as an instrument of national policy and pledged themselves to settle disputes by peaceful means only. The Pact was regarded as the portent of a new era. The more devastating judgment of historians is that it clouded the vision of the statesmen of the 1930s.

The declaratory approach is not dead. It is implicit in the idea of a commitment to non-first-use of nuclear weapons. That idea is being seriously advanced by some and seriously entertained by others. It is difficult to dismiss because it would give expression and authority to a widely-shared perception of international morality.

It may have a part to play as an assurance to countries that have renounced nuclear weapons. But it is important not to mistake the shadow for the substance. Declarations of good intent are no substitute for real disarmament. They need be violated only once. At that point they become scraps of paper. They have no impact on capabilities or on the resources those capabilities consume. Indeed, their effect may be negative, by diverting attention from the requirement of real disarmament, which is to reduce armed forces and armaments.

If the declaratory approach places an unreasonable reliance on the value of good intentions, the notion of general and complete disarmament has proved to be equally unrealistic in its expectations. The term was coined at the World Disarmament Conference of 1932. But the notion was at the heart of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Covenant spoke of the "reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety".

The perspective shifted with the coming into being of the United Nations. With the experience of the Second World War still fresh in mind, the emphasis of the Charter was on collective security. With the development of nuclear weapons and the failure of the ideas embodied in the Charter, general and complete disarmament again emerged as the dominant theme in the disarmament debate. It has since been reaffirmed in countless resolutions as the basic principle and ultimate goal of the world community.

It is important to remember how wide a range of vision was embraced by the concept of general and complete disarmament in the early 1960s. What was envisaged was not only the disbanding of armed forces, the dismantling of military establishments, the cessation of weapons-production and the elimination of weapons-stockpiles. The counterpart to global demilitarization was a global security system involving reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

The vision is not to be faulted. General and complete disarmament remains the ultimate goal of our efforts to advance the reality of disarmament. In practice, it raised serious questions in the minds of the negotiators: What should be the military balance at each stage of the process? What kind of inspection system could be relied upon to give assurance that engagements were being carried out? How would an

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