

indefinitely. If they were forced, countries such as Canada might “seek greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security” (Document 363). Although Canadian officials did not give up on the U.N., the hopes for a universal collective security system were all but extinguished, and the search for alternatives was beginning.

There was abundant other evidence of the deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and the West. The Council of Foreign Ministers had agreed upon the final drafts of the peace treaties with Italy and the other former satellites in December 1946, but progress on the core of the European settlement, the German question, remained elusive. The Moscow meeting of the Council in March-April 1947 produced no agreement on any issue of substance, and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and the American Secretary of State, George Marshall, left the Russian capital convinced that the division of Germany and hence of Europe was inevitable. The November-December session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London confirmed the by now obvious. British historian Elisabeth Barker put it well: 1947 was the year when the concept of the Big Three as the governing factor in world affairs finally perished. It was not yet clear what would replace it.⁴

Meanwhile — even as the Moscow Conference opened — the President of the United States had unleashed the powerful anti-Soviet rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine, which pledged support for “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”⁵ American historians differ on the significance of the doctrine in the context of an emerging Cold War,⁶ but Canadian diplomats were unambiguous that it had revolutionized the international environment. “The one-world conception is laid aside,” wrote the ambassador in Washington, Hume Wrong, “. . . the President’s policy divides the world between the Soviet sphere and the rest.”⁷ Truman’s “All-Out” speech in March was followed by one in June at Harvard University by the U.S. Secretary of State. Marshall outlined the profound challenges which faced a still-devastated Europe and hinted that the Truman administration would look favourably on a programme for economic assistance. This set in train developments which led to the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Western Europe.⁸

As Truman and Marshall and their colleagues moved to halt the march of Communism, Canadian officials debated the nature and implications of a new order

⁴Elisabeth Barker, *The British Between Superpowers, 1945-1950* (Toronto and London, 1983), p. 69. On Moscow, see Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston, 1978), p. 301, and Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951* (New York and London, 1983), pp. 393-4.

⁵Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947* (New York, 1972), p. 350.

⁶See Robert A. Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York, 1985), pp. 130-1.

⁷Quoted in Denis Smith, *Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War 1941-1948* (Toronto, 1988), p. 188.

⁸“The Marshall Plan,” Circular A. 146 to Heads of Canadian Missions Abroad, December 10, 1947, National Archives of Canada (NA), Records of the Department of External Affairs, File 9770-A-40, part 5.