

3. I then called on Mr. Hume Wrong with whom I discussed the question at some length. It was at this stage that I telephoned you in order to ascertain if, as a result of your conversations with Field Marshal Sir John Dill in Ottawa and Montreal on Wednesday, 21st January, your views had changed or been modified in any way. As you will recall, it was on this occasion that you told me that the Field Marshal had said that he proposed to telegraph the British Chiefs of Staff in London an outline of how he thought the Canadian Army representative might work with the British Joint Staff.

4. On Friday morning, 23rd January, I called on Lieut.-General Wemyss, the Commander of the Army branch of the British Joint Staff, to whom I first carefully explained the informal and exploratory nature of my visit. I then gave him a brief summary of how we thought that the Canadian Army could share in and contribute to the work he was engaged in. Wemyss, as usual, was friendly. He was also careful in what he said and I understood him to infer that the telegram Sir John Dill was sending to London would not necessarily bring about a speedy British approach to Ottawa.

5. I have not outlined the conversations I have so far mentioned because Wemyss arranged that I should meet the Field Marshal later in the day so that I might obtain the latter's views at first hand.

6. Accompanied by Brigadier Letson, I called on Sir John Dill late on Friday afternoon by whom I was cordially received. I began saying that my object was solely to ascertain how the question in our minds was viewed by the interested parties actually on the spot. So far as Canada was concerned, I said that there was no thought in our minds of claiming an equal voice in the direction of the united war effort in respect of theatres in which we had but a general and perhaps somewhat remote interest. On the other hand there were theatres, of which the Western Hemisphere was one, in which we were directly and vitally concerned and in respect of which we did expect to be represented on the highest Service level. I observed, moreover, that from our point of view the question was not without important political aspects.

7. This being the case, I continued, we were desirous of sitting in with the Chiefs of Staff when questions affecting Canada were under discussion and it therefore followed that it would be of advantage for us to be represented on the Joint Planning Section and probably on the Joint Intelligence Section as well. Both of these Sections form part of the British Joint Staff. The need for active participation in the work of the Allocations Committee was, of course, clearly apparent; indeed, as he was aware, a Canadian officer (Colonel Mavor) was already in Washington in an unofficial capacity but nevertheless actively participating in the business in hand. So far as the proposed shipping Committee was concerned, I had little or no information but felt that as and when the general principle of Army representation was agreed upon, a satisfactory solution would follow as a natural consequence.

8. Sir John then said that he was fully alive to the importance of the political aspects of the question and he clearly indicated that he had in mind not only those of the moment but also those that might become apparent during the post-war period. As for the Canadian Army representative, he entirely agreed that in