Proceedings on Adjournment Motion

which must affect not only the transport facilities available to Canadians but the development of our export trade.

The key to the Yellowhead route is that it takes advantage of the finest pass in the Canadian Rockies at an elevation of some 2,000 feet less than that of Rogers Pass. At its highest snowfall level, this route experiences less than 50 per cent of the snow recorded on the other route over a long period. Climatic conditions along the two routes vary widely. The most undesirable of climatic conditions affecting motor travel is doubtless snowfall and its accompanying hazards. Along one path of the Yellowhead the most severe snowfall occurs at Blue River, approximately 146 miles northeast by road from Kamloops where an average 159 inches falls annually over the long term. Secondary to this, the average annual snowfall at Red Pass, some 42 miles west of Jasper, is 137 inches. These two spots represent the only two major areas where snowfall is significantly greater than would be encountered across the Prairies. At no point along the entire route is snowfall heavy enough to present the danger of an avalanche. Thus, the danger of snowslides does not exist along the Yellowhead.

This is not the case, however, along the Rogers Pass section of the trans-Canada highway. Rogers Pass experiences one of the highest recorded annual snowfalls in Canada. The long-term average is 370 inches per year. Further, even at Lake Louise, only 50 miles or so into the Rockies, snowfall approaches 200 inches per year, greater than at any point along the Yellowhead route. Road closures due to avalanches or to the danger of avalanches are a frequent occurrence along the southern route, seriously hampering the scheduling of passage of vehicles using it during the winter. An analysis of the statistics makes it obvious that on a year-round basis, due to elevation and grades, and on a seasonal basis due to snowfall. the Yellowhead route is not just an alternative route between the Prairies and the coast: it is, indeed, a much superior one.

Mr. Gustave Blouin (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Public Works): Mr. Speaker, I am pleased tonight to answer, in the name of the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Dubé), the very talkative member for Edmonton Centre (Mr. Paproski).

Mr. Dinsdale: Articulate is the word.

Mr. Blouin: Here is the information I have obtained. The trans-Canada highway through Banff National Park was financed and constructed by the Department of Public Works originally as a two-lane facility, the majority of the work being done during the 1950s. With the completion of the trans-Canada highway through Rogers Pass to Revelstoke and with the increased tourist activity, traffic volumes increased considerably.

• (2200)

Mr. Dinsdale: That was in 1962.

Mr. Blouin: I suppose it was previous to the time you were minister. Extensive traffic studies were carried out by the department which indicated conclusively that there was need for a four-lane facility from the east gate of Banff to mile 47, and that recognized warrants for such a

facility were greatly exceeded. The large traffic increase was compounded when the province completed its section from Calgary to Banff east gate as a four-lane facility. It should be noted, however, that under the trans-Canada highway agreement Canada shared in the original construction of a two-lane highway on this section but the later improvement to a four-lane facility was planned and financed solely by the provincial government. Thus, the decision to twin the trans-Canada highway from the Banff east gate westerly was based purely on need and there was no discrimination against any other highway.

I am glad to have been able to supply this information to the hon. member for Edmonton Centre, and there is more detail that could be made available to him if he wishes it.

Mr. Paproski: What about the Yellowhead route? You have said nothing about the Yellowhead route.

Mr. Blouin: I have the information here.

The Acting Speaker (Mr. Boulanger): Order, please.

DRUGS—REQUEST THAT FURTHER REPORTS OF LE DAIN COMMISSION BE WITHHELD PENDING INCLUSION OF CAUTIONARY FOREWORD

Mr. H. E. Stafford (Elgin): Mr. Speaker, the Le Dain interim report of May, 1970, and the latest part of the report entitled "Treatment" have many well documented errors and inadequacies. These are the product of bias and incomplete research. I suggest to this House that we must insist that the expected publication and distribution of the Le Dain commission's forthcoming major study on cannabis be withheld from public distribution until a team of leading Canadian medical scientists has examined it carefully.

Ten prominent Canadian doctors proposed this measure in a Canadian Press statement of October 14, 1971, to the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) and to the federal and provincial ministers of health and welfare, and justice. "Silence must end," they said, denouncing the interim report of the Le Dain commission. "In our judgment, the Le Dain commission showed both bias and social and scientific irresponsibility" in some of the evidence presented, while "evidence of the harmful effects of this drug, cannabis, was buried under hundreds of pages so that no clear warning could be derived by an uncritical reader". The signers included the former head of the Canadian Psychiatric Association and doctors associated with six prominent Canadian universities and hospitals.

I also have a 70-page study of the interim report prepared by Dr. Fred Lundell, eminent practitioner, associate professor of psychiatry at McGill University and head of a hospital drug research team, which criticizes the interim report in these words: "The studies selected for discussion were highly edited and hardly current" and, further, "Serious reactions—to cannabis—do occur with greater frequency and more severe consequences than suggested in the report".

Dr. Conrad Swartz, prominent drug research specialist and chief psychiatrist at the student health centre, University of British Columbia, in his study of the interim report