

nection with the embroglio which occurred last September. He said, as I understood it, that parliament should have been assembled. Now, I do not know that it is advisable on every such occasion that parliament should be assembled. It would rather tend to indicate that we had not the confidence in the administration that we should have. Nothing has transpired since to show that it was necessary that parliament should have been called together, and when he or some other member who criticised the government action, said that the only one that was consulted then was the then leader of the Progressive party (Mr. Crerar) and suggested that the right hon. leader of the Opposition (Mr. Meighen) should have been consulted, it seemed to me that the member's mind was going back to 1914. I think hon. members might well go back and consider who was consulted then. Was the opposition at that time taken into the confidence of the government?

Mr. MEIGHEN: Yes, they were.

Mr. RAYMOND: The right hon. member says, "yes, they were," but if they were, why was it necessary afterwards to form a Union government? If the opposition had at that time been taken into the confidence of the government, we would have had a united government, and never would have had any cause afterwards to remedy the mistake, or to pretend to remedy it by forming what was called the Union government, but it will forever be looked upon by future historians as the greatest mistake that ever happened in the history of Canada, that party politics—I can call it nothing else—prevailed to such an extent that Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal party were not taken into the confidence of the then government of Canada, in order that they might turn their attention to winning the war. To me that is and always will be one of the most regrettable incidents in our history, and I think there is no man who remembers those times who will not say that the action of the then government was strongly coloured by that partisan spirit that hon. gentlemen have this afternoon deplored, or pretended to deplore from their seats in parliament.

But to go back to the incident of last September, I understand—and I think I do—the events that happened then and their sequence, I will endeavour to describe them without meandering through the circuitous paths of diplomatic language or crossing the plain highway of thought. I would ask the House to consider carefully this circumstance, because it was the actual circumstance by

which the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) had to be governed at the time. A telegram came, which was as a bolt out of the blue, asking the extent to which Canada was prepared to back up the British policy in the Near East. I think hon. members will agree with me so far that that is what happened. The Prime Minister had to consider from whom that telegram came. It did not come from the coolest-headed member of the British government; it came from one who has been considered rather impetuous, a very Hotspur, one who said, if you remember, Sir, at the beginning of the war, that he would send the British navy to dig the Germans out of their holes like rats if their fleet stayed in port. That was a bold statement; but it was one at which the First Sea Lord and the men of the Admiralty smiled with their tongues in their cheeks. It was from a man of that impetuous disposition that this telegram came, and the reply of the Prime Minister, when he asked for further information that he might be informed more distinctly what the policy of Great Britain was in the Near East with regard to Turkey, sprinkled upon the ardour of the one who had sent the message those few cold drops of modesty that were necessary to cause a more deliberate consideration.

If as the event proved, it became unnecessary either that Canada should signify her distinct acquiescence in the policy of Great Britain with regard to Turkey, or state whether she would send a contingent to assist in the execution of the British plans in the Near East, it would have been absurd or ridiculous for the Prime Minister or the government to commit this country to anything of the kind. We should know exactly what we are going to do before we undertake to support any commitment. Some say: "Well, Australia did this, and New Zealand did it." I do not want the action or the attitude or the mind of Australia or New Zealand ever to influence the mind of Canada with regard to her destiny. We have a right to say that, amongst the various dominions of the Empire, this Dominion, which was the one which solved the problem of Imperial government and made it possible for those other dominions to come into existence and exist as a commonwealth of nations, is not called upon to heed to their actions. Each one must act for itself, and it is for Canada to take her own place, her own part, to look at her own future and destiny in the decisions which she makes.

Some say: "It should have been done for the moral effect." Mark the use of the word "moral"—the moral effect. If bluffing