

attribution of the Canadian effort to the outcomes. In other words, these objectives were achieved, but the degree to which they can be deemed to be a result of Canadian actions is open to debate. Some argue that the mere threat of a MNF, as initiated by Canada, was the impetus for the Tutsis' to infiltrate the refugee camps, dislodge the Hutu position and allow for the return of the refugees.

On the other hand, a multinational force, outside of the Canadian command, was never actually deployed. It can be argued that the MNF rationale was overtaken by events, specifically, the return of the refugees. Alternatively, it can also be argued that there is questionable latitude for a nation, other than a 'super power' to manage the international leadership role.

The second set of results, brought forward in this study, deal more explicitly with Canadian actions, and include; "the quick deployment of troops, the integration of humanitarian and political thrusts in a military intervention, Canadian leadership in breaking the United Nations logjam, Canadian leadership in drawing the international community together through the Steering Group, and, more generally, in turning international attention to the issues in the Great Lakes Region."

Here a **causal link between these results and DFAIT-specific contributions** is more evident.

- Political and humanitarian advisors were assigned to General Baril, the leader of the MNF.
- DFAIT personnel drafted the United Nations Resolution which led to the approval of a Chapter VII intervention.
- DFAIT convened and chaired the International Steering Group (consisting of troop-contributing nations, key Humanitarian Agencies and major financial donors) and provided critical policy, informational and logistical support.
- Similarly, the mission by the Special Envoy of the United Nations, Ambassador Chrétien was assisted in large part by DFAIT Headquarters and Post work.
- The department was instrumental in negotiating and obtaining