

could be improved with the help of the Secretariat. In this regard the publication of a recent 'how to' handbook is a positive step.<sup>32</sup> Timely seminars would also help.

It also became clear that participation in the first year varied significantly among regions. There are many non-reporting states who were either confused by the reporting requirements or indifferent. The above steps designed to improve the level of confirmed and transparent data would go a long way toward achieving more balanced participation among regions. In addition, key supporters of the Register, and in particular the UNCDA, could actively promote the Register. The previously discussed regional workshops were quite successful and need to be expanded to insure all states attend. Finally, increased effort must be made to link participation with the aforementioned goals and objectives. Many states which either did not participate or did so at a minimal level were tempted to view the exercises as transparency for transparency sake.

*Developing the Register Into an Arms Acquisition Register.* Resolution 46/36 L and the political deals that resulted in its unanimous passage clearly intended that the Register would expand to an *acquisitions* Register at an early date. The first step in such a process is the inclusion of data on weapons that are procured through national production. Pakistan, to use but one example, rightly feels that a Register restricted to reporting imports is discriminatory in the extreme since its regional rival India imports little but produces a great deal. As a first step it would be more palatable for most states if no new categories were added, which would require hammering out a definitional consensus. This will be difficult absent a post-Iraq war environment in which many states felt compelled to go along with a register that they had problems with in the name of coming out politically against the behaviour of Iraq. In short, adding procurement through national production was part of the original bargain and cannot be reneged on at this time.

It should be clear, however, this step will require a new definitional exercise similar to that which took place when developing definitions for arms transfers. The 1992 panel outlined a series of questions that must be answered in this regard.<sup>33</sup> Also the level of difficulty for states in collecting the information necessary for such a report goes up accordingly. Arms transfers involve international trade and most states have developed laws and procedures which allow for the relatively easy generation of information. When it comes to procurement through national production, in many states this involves complex relationships and contractual arrangements with private firms. There is a much greater variety of stages in procurement that will create confusion, probably meaning that no

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<sup>32</sup> United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, *Register of Conventional Arms: Information Booklet* (New York, 1993).

<sup>33</sup> UN Secretary General, *Report on the Register of Conventional Arms*, UN Document A/47/342 (New York: United Nations, 14 August 1992), paragraph 41(f), p. 18.