

- protecting strategic strike capabilities (specifically SSBNs);
- conducting strategic and theatre-nuclear strikes;
- neutralizing Japan and South Korea to prevent them from supporting American forces;
- controlling ocean areas contiguous to the USSR,;
- preventing offensive action by American naval forces and seeking out and destroying these forces at sea;
- containing China;
- controlling key straits in the region;
- attacking allied sea lines of communication (SLOCS) throughout the region.

These missions highlight the strategic importance of the Northern Territories and the Kuriles and explained the Soviet rationale for placing them in a "sea control zone", control of which would have facilitated the movement of Soviet naval forces between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan, including the resupply of Petropavlovsk.

In the event of hostilities, control of the straits adjacent to Japan would have been seriously contested. The Soviets could have provided a credible naval and air defence of the Northern Territories, the Kuriles, and the western Pacific. Soviet planners realized that American and Japanese naval units would have been capable of causing substantive damage to Soviet vessels in confined waters, and Soviet attack submarines and strike bombers would have attacked allied naval and air forces, specifically U.S. carrier battle groups, before they could reach within striking range of the USSR and before they could have contributed to the air battle over the Northern Territories, the Kuriles, and Hokkaido.

15. While Japan will continue to increase its share of maintenance costs for American forces stationed in Japan (as a means to easing the burden-sharing concerns expressed by the Administration and Congress), overall Japanese defence spending will continue at its current rate but will be adversely affected by any decrease in the value of the Yen and by any shrinkage in government tax revenues.
16. See Policy Planning Staff Paper No. 92/3, "Canada and Asia Pacific Security: The North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue: Recent Trends", External Affairs and International Trade Canada, January, 1992.
17. Japanese views of various Asia Pacific security proposals have been almost uniform in their disapproval. Initiatives from Mongolia and Korea were commented on favourably but not pursued. Tokyo dismissed Soviet proposals as self-serving and hollow, and criticised Australia and Canada for their naïveté in appearing to follow the Soviet's regional agenda or to impose European models on Asia. The