

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

such inspections could add much to what has already been learned from national inspections. Instead of focusing attention on multilateral inspections, it would be better to undertake several types of multilateral activities related to chemical industry verification. Collectively, these might be termed a multilateral verification experiment. This could include such activities as visits to chemical plants and on-site demonstrations of inspection procedures. Work by multilateral expert teams to solve problems discovered in national trial inspections, such as the need for on-site instrumentation and the question of how to handle verification data that is acquired on industry activities, are other important matters deserving attention.

Before leaving the subject of trial inspections, I would like to express our appreciation to Ambassador Hyltenius and the Swedish delegation. They have been instrumental in the success of the initial trial inspection activities. We hope that the Conference will be able to draw on their political skill and technical expertise in future work in this area.

With regard to monitoring the chemical industry, the Conference has sought to find a way to extend the verification system of the draft convention to chemical production facilities that are not covered by the existing data reporting and inspection régimes, but that could be used for chemical weapons production. These are the so-called "CW-capable" facilities. For this reason, some had advocated that a new list, which was initially called "Schedule [4]", be established with a monitoring régime very similar to the already agreed régime for key precursors under schedule [2]. The United States position, based on the 1984 United States draft convention, has been that any toxic commercial chemical that poses a substantial risk should be placed under the same monitoring régime as key precursors, and that a separate, new schedule is not necessary. In addition, we have expressed concern about "CW-capable" facilities.

Positions have been evolving as a result of the detailed technical discussions of the schedule [4] concept. The flaws in a separate schedule [4] are now broadly recognized and delegations are groping for an alternative. During the spring part of the 1989 session, a proposal to subdivide schedule [2] to create a "schedule [2B]" for toxic chemicals attracted considerable interest. In addition, the United Kingdom has suggested that its concept of "ad hoc inspections" could assist in dealing with the "CW-capable" facilities themselves. Most delegations, however, have not formally committed themselves on these ideas. Nor has a clear picture emerged of what specific chemicals should be placed on a list.

After carefully reviewing the different approaches, the United States believes that both a schedule [2B] and ad hoc verification provisions are necessary. We propose that the insecticide "Amiton" be placed on schedule [2B]. This insecticide, which is no longer produced, is chemically related to the nerve agent VX and is extremely toxic. Existing toxicity information is sparse, but it suggests that this chemical falls in the super-toxic lethal range. We are not persuaded that any of the other toxic chemicals suggested for the list are appropriate.