

tile landing has been effected."

Special Idea.—"Landing Force.—Land a brigade at Kingsdown and occupy a position to cover the disembarkation of a division. Hold the position till 12.15 p.m., when the 2nd Brigade will have completed its landing, and will reinforce."

Special Idea.—Dover Field Force.—Advance from St. Margaret's at 11 a.m., make a reconnaissance in force towards Kingsdown, attack the enemy wherever found. No man of the force to be north of St. Margaret's before 11 a.m. To Brigadier Commanding.—North London Brigade.—The position taken up by Col. Jenkin's force was almost impregnable to a front attack. Owing, however, to the limited area of ground available, and also to the shortness of the time at his disposal, the commanders of the attacking force could do nothing else. The ground in front and on both banks of the entrenched position to be attacked was steep and absolutely free from all cover to a distance of 800 or 900 yards. Running obliquely across the front of defenders' position was a low spur. This spur formed the only rallying place for the attackers in front. On the right flank and front of the position there was a wood; but unfortunately the exit from this wood was prohibited by cultivation. The reconnaissance was a matter of form only, as the defenders' entrenchments, marked by broad bunches of white canvas, were clearly discernible from a long way off.

As there was no artillery on either side the preliminary stage of the attack, although distinctly visible from the position, was not watched with the same interest it would have been if the advance had been under fire. From what I afterwards gathered, the Brigadier commanding left the development of the attack to the commanders of the battalions in the first line. The result was disappointing. There appeared to be a total want of grasp of the situation. The low spur alone afforded cover for the frontal attack, behind which cohesion might have been established between the units in the first line preparatory to a sudden and rapid advance over the intervening dip and up the opposite hillside. In the absence of artillery this dash forward might have been supported by the fire of specially detailed troops on the flanks. The attack against the defenders' right flank should have been simultaneous with that directed against his left and left centre. The second line should have followed the first over the low spur at a distance of 200 yards. There was no more rallying possible, and it is hardly conceivable that in the absence of artillery to prepare the way for the attack it would have been successful. Still front attacks have been successful before, and under certain conditions will probably have to be resorted to in future.

It only remains to be said that owing to some mistake the direction was lost by the regiment on the extreme right going beyond the limits of the ground, which subsequently led to

a needless huddling together of troops on this flank, not behind the low spur, which would have been undesirable, but beyond its southern extremity and directly under the carefully aimed volleys of an entire battalion entrenched and a machine gun, all firing at 800 yards. Rounding this corner, the larger portion of the troops on the right of the attack were swept down by half companies; and even if some few of them had survived, they had still 800 yards of open slope before them. Why they came round the spur instead of over it puzzled most of the spectators. The attack against the right of the position was, I am told, conducted better than that against the left; but, unfortunately, that against the left was the principal one, as it was directed against the enemy's line of retreat. There was a total absence of dash, direction, and cohesion, which afforded a valuable lesson to the defenders by demonstrating now not to deliver an attack. The scrub at the extremity of the low spur caught fire, but this was not till after the greater portion of the troops on the right had passed round it.

After a heavy repulse, an interval of ten minutes was granted to the attacking troops to rearrange themselves behind the spur; and, subsequently, under the initiative of the Major-General commanding the South-Eastern District and the Brigadier's orders, a second advance was made. The left flank of the defence was ordered to fall back before their assailants, and the battle of Kingsdown came to an end.

I was much struck with the youthful appearance of the regular troops, but their steadiness was most marked, and their fire discipline remarkably good. On the part of the defence I observed two mistakes, neither of which would have been allowed to take place on service, but are none the less reprehensible on that account. The first was the piquet on the left, holding the extremity of the low spur above alluded to, which traversed the position, needlessly disclosed themselves to the view of their assailants when they all stood up to watch a dog chasing a hare. The second was the presence of officers of the second line of the defence standing about in groups immediately in rear of the first line after the latter had manned the trenches.

The marching of the Volunteers was decidedly good. The hastily improvised march-past in the presence of the Secretary of State for War, who was a spectator, was creditable; and the fire discipline, so far as I was able to observe it, steady; but the attack was simply awful. R. H. G.

GUILFORD.

So far as the Surrey Brigade at Guildford was concerned, the field day on Monday gave promise of great success, for the arrangements were for the Aldershot Division to take part in the

operations. On the Saturday, however, the Surrey men were not idle, for Lord Belhaven drew up an excellent plan of operations for that day, which was well carried out.

On the Monday the mimic-combat was witnessed by the Commander-in-Chief and officers of the Horse Guards Staff. The general idea presumed that an invader having landed on the south coast had reached Haslemere and from there pushed forward a force of all arms to make a reconnaissance in force northward in the direction of Aldershot. This force, which was under the command of Major-Gen. C. F. Gregorie, consisted of the 1st Infantry Brigade from Aldershot, a regiment of cavalry, three field-batteries, and the Surrey Volunteer Infantry Brigade. It was also assumed that a northern force under Major Gen. Utterson had advanced from Workingham, and had on Sunday night encamped at Frimley Green. This force consisted of a cavalry regiment, three batteries, and a brigade of infantry. Gen. Utterson's instructions were to advance to the Fox Hills and there endeavor to keep the invader in check until reinforcements in the shape of another three batteries and a brigade of infantry could arrive from the main body at Workingham. Gen. Gregorie's orders were to push forward over the Fox Hills and secure the passages over the Basingstroke Canal at Frimhurst. The northern force took up a position extending from Gravel Pit Hill in the south, along the eastern portion of the Fox Hills, the Cavalry being pushed forward to feel for the invaders advancing from Normandy. The Cavalry of the latter quickly came into contact with that of the former, and Gregorie's Artillery having taken position proceeded to engage that of the defence. The artillery duel, as usual in sham combats, was of short duration, for Gregorie's Infantry soon made their advance felt and gradually Utterson had to give way before the superior forces which were hurled against him. At this moment, however, reinforcements in the shape of three more batteries and three battalions came to the aid of the sorely pressed defenders; but with this increase of strength, and with a preponderance of artillery over that of his opponent, Utterson was able to effect very little, for he had even then but seven battalions as compared with 13 at the disposal of his antagonist, who piled man upon man, and quickly forced him to retire to the north. When the cease-fire sounded about one o'clock the defenders had abandoned the hill, and were in full retreat, hard pressed by the attacking infantry; but the whole effect of what should have been a most interesting and instructive piece of work was from the very commencement spoiled by the enormous number of sightseers who congregated between the opposing forces. But for the civilian spectators the affair would undoubtedly have been one of the most instructive mimic combats ever witnessed at Easter.—*Army and Navy Gazette.*