

## THANKSGIVING HYMN.

(USED IN THE ANGLICAN CHURCHES OF CANADA.)

"Turn again our captivity, O Lord, as thou hast said in the South." "They that sow in tears shall reap in joy."

O Thou, our soul's salvation!  
Our hope for earthly woe!  
We who, in tribulation,  
Did for Thy mercy kneel,  
Lift up glad hearts before Thee  
And eyes no longer dim;  
And for Thy grace adore Thee  
In Eucharistic hymn.

Forth went the nation weeping  
With precious seed of prayer;  
Hope's awful vigil keeping  
Mid rumours of despair.  
Then did Thy love deliver,  
And from Thy gracious hand  
Joy, like the Southern river,  
O'erflowed the weary land.

Bless Thou our adoration!  
Our gladness sanctify!  
Make this rejoicing nation  
To Thee by joy more high.  
O be this great Thanksgiving,  
Throughout the land we raise,  
Wrought into holler living,  
In all our after days.

Bless, Father, him Thou gavest  
Back to the loyal land;  
O Saviour, him thou savest  
Still cover with Thine hand;  
O Spirit, the Defender,  
Be his to guard and guide—  
Now in life's mid-day splendour,  
On to the eventide! Amen.

## REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON REORGANIZATION OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

*Continued from page 191.*

32. The object of this proposed arrangement is that soldiers being interchangeable at the pleasure of the Secretary of State for War between battalions of the same brigade or district, the battalion at home may always be depended on to supply with certainty, and just when required, the casualties of the battalion abroad.

33. The normal condition in peace would be seventy pairs of battalions, of which one battalion would be always abroad; the other always at home; the casualties of the former being supplied as a general rule straight from the latter. For so soon as the system should come into complete operation, the Line recruits of any brigade district would be passed from the depot, after their recruit training, into the home Line battalion of the district; and the supplies of men required to fill vacancies in the battalion abroad would be drawn off from the home Line battalion as needed.

34. But the sole object of any military system in peace is to provide for a state of war; and the test of any peace organization must be its power—

1st. To place in the field immediately on the outbreak of war, in the highest state of efficiency, as large a force as is possibly compatible with the peace military expenditure.

2nd. To maintain that force throughout the continuance of hostilities undiminished in numbers and efficiency.

The question whether the new system now proposed will fulfill the two preceding conditions is examined below.

35. Supposing it were desired immediately on the outbreak of war to send to the scene of action fifty battalions of infantry without diminishing the Indian and Colonial garrisons, the despatch of that expeditionary force would leave fifty out of the seventy pairs of Line battalions without any Line battalions at home.

The active measures consequent on such a contingency may be assumed somewhat as follows:—

1. All Line battalions at home to be raised to war strength, the fifty expeditionary battalions being first considered, by calling up Army Reserve men to the colours, supplementing the deficiency, if any, by Militia Reserve and volunteers from Militia battalions.

2. In each of the fifty districts required to furnish expeditionary battalions, embody both Militia battalions.

3. In each of the remaining districts embody one Militia battalion.

4. Complete each depot centre to a full battalion to serve as a training battalion for recruits.

5. Complete all embodied Militia battalions to war strength.

6. Make all enlistments during the war for general service in the Line and Militia battalions of any brigade district.

36. Thus 50 districts would each have one of its battalions in India or the Colonies, and the other at the theatre of war. These would depend for the supply of their casualties on the two embodied Militia battalions of their brigade district, and below them on the depot, recruits being passed from the depot as soon as drilled into the Militia battalions of the district; and reinforcements for the army in the field, consisting of the best drilled soldiers of the Militia battalions, being obtained from these battalions by volunteering, or transfer, as the case might be.

37. For the purposes of this supply the district represents the grand reservoir; the depot the expense reservoir; the two Militia battalions represent the grand cistern, from which two channels uniting would pour a stream of reinforcements into the cistern of the field battalion.

38. Twenty districts would each have one of its Line battalions in India or the Colonies, and the other at home. For each such district the battalion abroad would depend for the supply of casualties on the home Line battalion and the depot below it. The home Line battalion, kept up to war strength and backed moreover by the one embodied Militia battalion of its brigade district, also at war strength, would be available either for reinforcing the field army, or for relieving one of the battalions of that army, as occasion might require.

39. If it were desired to reinforce the field army by Line battalions drawn from the colonies, and to replace the latter with Militia battalions that might volunteer for such service, the latter might be found by embodying to the required extent the second Militia battalions in a certain number of the 20 districts specified in the next preceding paragraph.

40. The condition of any one of the "certain number" of districts here alluded to would then be as follows:—

One Line battalion in India or Colonies.  
One Militia battalion in Colonies.  
One Line battalion at home.  
One Militia battalion at home.  
Depot battalion.

41. The Line battalion abroad would be kept up to full strength by drafts from its twin Line battalion at home, or from the depot, or from both sources.

The Militia battalion abroad would be supplied from its twin embodied Militia battalion at home, or from the depot, or from both sources.

While the gaps thereby created in the ranks of the Line battalion and Militia battalion at home would be filled up straight from the depot.

42. It is by no means intended that Militia battalions, any more than Line battalions,

serving at home, are to be regarded merely as recruiting agents for battalions serving abroad. Militia battalions, like Line battalions, would be liable to be called up into the line of battle in case of an invasion of this country. But until required for such active service, they would be employed in the ordinary home duties of those Line battalions then at the seat of war, whose vacated quarters they would occupy. They would be in the same position as Line battalions serving at home, and would like the latter be called upon to contribute most materially towards the successful termination of the war, by training good soldiers to be sent against the common enemy.

43. In comparing the probable results of the new proposed method with the known results of that which has been hitherto employed, there would seem little reason to doubt that the new plan would supply reinforcements during war with certainty and regularity.

44. A disadvantage attaching to the rigid localisation of a military force is, that districts required to furnish and maintain field battalions in war would be depleted after a time of their fighting population, while the remainder would be untouched.

Under the voluntary system of England it would be easy to provide against such a contingency, either by requiring districts not represented in the field to raise each a certain number of recruits yearly for districts having battalions at the seat of war; or by calling for a certain yearly quota of volunteers from each Line battalion at home for service with battalions of the field army; or by both methods conjointly.

45. It is not unreasonable to expect that the intimate connection, which it is one great object of the new proposed system to create between the Line and Militia battalions of a brigade district, will induce the commanding officers of Militia to forward the interests of their connected Line battalions by encouraging, in place of as heretofore opposing, the enlistment of their men in regiments of the Regular Army.

46. It has been stated (paragraph 35) that on the outbreak of war, battalions at home would be immediately raised to war strength by recalling the men who had been transferred from service with the colours to service in the Army Reserve, and by supplying their deficiency in numbers, if any with Militia Reserve and Militia Volunteers.

47. The total number of men that would be required under the proposed system to complete the 71 home Line battalions to war strength is determined as follows:—

Battalions.	
18 at £20 to be raised to 1,000 (18 x 180)	3,240
18 " 750 " " (18 x 300)	5,400
35 " 520 " " (35 x 480)	16,800

Total 25,440

Thus, the total required to complete all Line battalions serving at home to an uniform strength of 1,000 rank and file would be 25,440

The 1st Class Army Reserve now numbers 7,022

The Militia Reserve 27,770

Total 34,792

Every year it is reasonable to expect a considerable increase to these numbers; but if an emergency were now to arise we should have 33,792 men instantly available to complete Line battalions for service, of whom 7,022 would be perfectly trained soldiers, and 27,770 would be Militia men who would have gone through at least one training, and would therefore be of far greater value than raw recruits.