

tioned ; and 3, that derived from *popularity*, since he conceived that the great majority would always be found on that side.

It is interesting and remarkable that so great a mind should have been able to find no higher motives than these upon which to base the claims of dogmatism, which meant, and still means, the acceptance of the main body of beliefs of the age. The first is of so low an order that it would seem to be beneath the dignity of a philosopher to entertain it. For what has man's practical interest to do with philosophy, with the attainment of truth in the domain of abstract thought ? The argument employed by Bishop Butler,—that a particular religion should be embraced, on the sole ground, if on no other, that there could be nothing to lose and might be much to gain by so doing, while, in the failure to do so, there was nothing to gain and might be much to lose (" Analogy of Rel.," p. 274),—has been generally condemned as of a low order, in appealing to practical interest where a question of abstract truth was involved. But Bishop Butler was avowedly a sectarian writer, defending his particular religion, and such low appeals were to be expected. How, then, could Kant justify an analogous argument ? As a disinterested philosopher, this would seem impossible. Yet Kant's justification, from his own peculiar point of view, though somewhat amusing, will appear to be quite satisfactory. It is this : Neither the thesis nor the antithesis of any of his antinomies is capable of proof, or rather, both are capable of formal demonstration ; and, being contradictories, all argument becomes absurd. With him, the universe is a great dilemma, of which any one may take either horn with exactly equal chances of reaching the truth. He had better, therefore, of course, choose the one which is most to his interest, and this, Kant thought, was unquestionably the dogmatic.

Precisely the same might be said of his third reason for choosing that side—viz., the advantage to be derived from its greater popularity. If possible, this claim possesses a still lower moral weight than that of practical interest, of which it is, indeed, merely a temporal form. Only politicians now urge it as a means to influencing men's opinions. It certainly could never be decently put forward except in just such a case as Kant conceived this to be—a case in which it would otherwise be absolutely immaterial which side one took. The truth itself was hopelessly unattainable, and, if any ulterior consequences were, as a matter of fact, to follow either decision, one was as likely to escape them by the one course as by the other. The only guide left, therefore, was simply present advantage ; and, be that the least greater on the one than on the other side, this would be sufficient to determine the decision.

Kant's second ground for accepting the thesis rather than the antithesis—viz., that of speculative interest—being highly philosophical, deserves more attention. And, logically enough, we find him enumerating, among the advantages which the mind is to derive from choosing the dogmatic side of these antinomies, that of *convenience*, or ease (*Gemachlichkeit*), and also that of *respectability*. Nothing is truer than that teleology is a relief to the overstrained intellect striving to build a universe between two infinities. It is the philosophy of the indolent brain, the *ignava ratio*, and is