

view come very close to admitting that CFA no longer has applicability or relevance to present situation in Vietnam and might well reduce to zero any deterrent influence which existence of CFA and ICSC may still have on DRVN.

3. You will recall that when we argued in April 1960 that MAAG increases at that time were made necessary by DRVN campaign of subversion, Indian representative countered that while these reasons might be of importance to parties, they could not provide sound criterion for a decision, which must be based strictly on provisions of CFA. While we would not wish to jeopardize apparent willingness of Indians in recent weeks to move rapidly on subversion cases by pushing them too far, their attitude does seem to justify a serious effort to determine whether they would in practice be prepared to modify stand they took in April 1960.

4. Direct Indian reversal cannot of course be expected, but we think it might be possible with some prospect of success to press argument that consideration of Nam and other subversion cases and consideration of USA reinforcement cases must proceed *pari passu* and that decision on one group must not be taken without decision on other group. We are glad to note from paragraph 7 your telegram 257 December 15† that this is general line you have been taking with Parthasarathi. At this stage it would seem unwise to indicate to him that any thought is being given to possibility of a Canadian minority report, although we would see no objection to your beginning preparation of such a report as suggested in your telegram 252 December 9.† It may be that best we can hope for is parallel handling of cases, presumably with special report to Co-Chairmen as final stage in process.

5. On question of early visit by Commission to Hanoi, you will of course have to be guided by local developments including views of Parthasarathi. While we have some reservations about practicability of Commission influencing developments these (having in mind particularly pressures to which Indians would be subjected) we recognize that visit has already been deferred and that you have not yet had opportunity to make official calls on DRVN authorities. Parthasarathi's concern lest visit delay subversion cases is encouraging, and would presumably prevent undue prolongation of visit.

[H.C.] GREEN

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*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador in United States
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 3804

Washington, December 16, 1961

SECRET. CANADIAN EYES ONLY. OPIMMEDIATE.

Reference: Our Tel 3790 Dec 15.

Repeat for Information: London, NATO Paris, Paris, Laosdel Geneva (Priority), Saigon (OpImmediate), Delhi (Priority) from Ottawa, DND, CCOS, CGS, DGPO Ottawa from Ottawa.

VIETNAM: LONGER TERM PROSPECTS; HARRIMAN'S VIEWS

Later in our conversation of December 15 we looked beyond the immediate future. Harriman said that President Kennedy definitely wanted to maintain the objective of free elections throughout Vietnam, as contemplated in the original Geneva declaration, although there was full recognition that in present circumstances in North Vietnam such a thing was impossible.