

Why then quarrel with me for not being willing to admit more than a sufficiency? The retrenchment of superfluous causes was the very principle upon which my conduct was founded, and the difficulty to which I alluded above, consisted in the discovery how this quotation could be construed into an argument for giving credence to whatever is "complicated and abstruse." Pardon me, Sophos, if I venture to draw the line of distinction between sense and learning, by saying, that in this case you have made a dismal sacrifice of the one in order to have the pleasure of exhibiting the other.

In endeavouring to prove the absurdity of supposing that human conduct can be referred to any thing else than an "abstruse and complicated" principle, our author exclaims "can sweet and bitter waters flow from the same fountain, or can the operations of love and revenge be referred to the same principle?" It is strange, Mr. Sophos, that the wisdom for which you give yourself such unsolicited credit, never reminded you that it was neither the sweetness, nor the bitterness which constituted the water, but that these were qualities derivable from a thousand contingencies. If then self-regard be the fountain of human conduct, the peculiarities in the streams may owe their origin to the particular channel through which they flow; or, in other words, to the circumstances of its manifestation.

But we are aware that metaphor is made to transgress its legitimate bounds, when used as argument, and therefore without dwelling further upon this illustration, we proceed to shew in what manner love and revenge may be traced to the same primary principle. The object to which every violent passion instigates us is its gratification. No man is ever under the influence of any powerful emotion which originates in either passions, or desires, but he feels a discomfort which he persuades himself nothing but the attainment of his wishes can remove. The lover may whine and the revengeful man may rave, but the object of both is nothing more than self-gratification. No one ever loves another without expecting that the gratification of his desires will render him happy, and it is the height of absurdity to suppose, that a man ever desires the injury of another, without an impression that he will derive a pleasure from it. Should a man under the influence of revengeful feelings be incited to the commission of a crime, and afterwards be attacked by remorse, it is not a regret for the injury which he has done to another, but merely a conviction that the crime will be fatal to his own happiness, that constitutes his remorse. As long as the criminal retains the impression that the consequences of his misconduct will be visited on himself, he is incapable of experiencing pleasure. As soon however as his dread of retribution is removed, he is once more susceptible to impressions of happiness. The felon who looks forward to an eternity of suffering is miserable as long as he perceives no other prospect. The