

invulnerable, assured destruction, strategic second strike forces. In a way, strategic stability became the answer to the question of "*how much is enough*".

Along with strategic stability, two other concepts also appeared: crisis stability and arms race stability. Both were defined by direct reference to the condition of strategic stability. Crisis stability (implicitly tied to Cold War crises such as Berlin) was a condition in which neither side in the midst of a political crisis possessed incentives to launch a first strike. In this sense, a crisis was understood as a shock to the system. If both sides possessed invulnerable assured destruction second strike forces (strategic stability), then neither side obtained incentives to go first. The net result was crisis stability, in which the shock or disturbance of a political crisis would not likely result in war. Of course, war could, at least theoretically, occur. But, war would not be the product of the strategic military relationship.

Arms race stability was a condition in which neither side was developing a new generation of strategic weapons whose deployment would undermine strategic stability. It was in the context of arms race stability that the issue of strategic missile defences arose. It was also this context that underpinned the emergence of arms control, and thus today's linkage of the ABM Treaty to strategic stability.

Basically, strategic missile defences threatened second strike forces. Recognizing that no strategic missile defence would be capable of defeating a large-scale, coordinated first strike, such a defence could possibly be effective against a counter-value retaliatory or second strike, especially after the launch of a successful counter-force first strike. The first strike would not only eliminate a large portion of an adversary's strategic forces, but it would also cripple its command and control system. In so doing, the strategic defence would face an uncoordinated, ragged retaliatory strike; a strike which missile defences could be effective against. Under this condition, both parties obtained incentives to go first, thus undermining strategic and crisis stability: the party with strategic defences, because going first held the potential of actually fighting and winning a nuclear war, and the party without, because it faced the prospect of complete destruction with little or any ability to strike back.

This logic is at the core of critics of missile defence during the Cold War. However, it was also recognized that the exact relationship between missile defences and strategic stability depended upon the nature of the defences. Missile defence was not de-stabilizing by definition. First, missile defences deployed to defend second strike forces were stabilizing, because they reinforced second strike invulnerability. Such defences represented one response to an adversary's development of strategic forces, which could threaten its opponent's strategic forces, even without a capability to disarm it completely (known in the 1980 US Presidential election campaign as the *window of vulnerability*). The logic here was that if one side possessed a capability to eliminate a significant portion of an opponent's strategic forces (i.e. its ICBMs), the result would place the opponent in a politically untenable position. It would confront the choice of either launching a retaliatory counter-value strike against its adversary's cities, knowing full well that the adversary possessed the means to retaliate, or surrender.

This missile defence de-stabilizing/stabilizing paradox was enshrined in the ABM Treaty, and it is in this context that the logic of the Treaty as *the*, or *a cornerstone* of stability is actually found. In prohibiting nation-wide defences, the Treaty ensured strategic stability. At the same time, it allowed for limited defences tied to stability concerns by permitting the deployment of a prescribed ABM system at two sites, subsequently amended in 1974 to either an ICBM field or national capital. As defending either was stabilizing, the US chose the former (Safeguard deployed for a limited period of time around the Grand Forks ICBM field), and the SU chose the latter (the Galosh system that still defends Moscow). Finally, in agreeing to a treaty without a time limit, arms race stability was also enshrined. Neither the US nor the SU could proceed to develop missile defence technologies and capabilities that would undermine