

something to dispel this image. However, Argentine financial resources are such that unless someone else assisted in paying for the deployment of such forces, it would be hard pressed to do much. Brazil has even more military resources than Argentina, has some peacekeeping experience and, as a member of the Contadora Support Group, is also interested in bringing about peace in Central America. While not so badly off economically as Argentina, Brazil also would have difficulties with the price tag for such involvement. Peru's troubles with the Sendero Luminoso guerillas may well preclude Lima's participation in peacekeeping and verification duties in Central America, but this is not certain.

Venezuela is perhaps the only Contadora state which could and would assist with military resources in Central America. Mexico, considered the "colossus of the North" by the Central Americans, is suspected by many of them to be harbouring its own designs on the region. Colombia's army is fully occupied in combatting the guerillas in its own country. Panama's forces may have their hands full just propping up the regime. Venezuela, however, has no internal security problems and has frequently in the recent past shown an interest in a more enlarged regional role in the Caribbean Basin. Its forces are significant and reasonably well equipped even if they have rather little relevant experience.

Thus, there are many question marks on who might be willing to assist, in what ways they could do so, and under what financial circumstances. Each national force added to the international force will add to the political, and probably the economic, viability of the operation but will probably further complicate its activities on the ground. Linguistic problems alone could be serious. Many of the operations involved with the verification provisions would frequently require delicate on-the-spot handling. Few non-Spanish speaking countries' forces could provide significant numbers of personnel speaking the local language. The West German army, even if it could send such personnel, has few of them. The Canadian Armed Forces are sadly lacking in personnel who can speak Spanish. And while obviously Spain could help in alleviating this problem, Madrid cannot be expected to accept gladly the burden of responsibility when local conditions get out of hand. Spanish American, and to some extent, Italian and Portuguese personnel would be particularly helpful in this regard.

The variety of groupings with which an international force would have to deal is also a daunting prospect. Many of these groups are armed and it is likely that far from all will be pleased with the peace accords. "Political" and security provision verification will bring international force military and civilian personnel into contact with political parties, an array of leftist guerilla organizations, semi-legal parties and organizations, armed rightist movements of ferocious determination, military forces and government officials. Previous peacekeeping and verification forces have generally found that a fraction of this plethora of groupings was enough to keep them busy and necessarily alert. Tact, understanding and resolve will be a combination without which the peace effort will be hamstrung.