

national Association for Seismology (IASPEI) at Strasbourg and Edinburgh, and further to the centres in Moscow and Washington. Apart from that the bulletins are sent to some 200 stations and institutes.

47. As far as an expansion and intensification of this activity are concerned, I should like to point out the view held by our experts that the necessary improvement of the existing international co-operation that would take into account not only the aspect of effectiveness but also that of restricting unnecessary financial cost has to be accomplished within the framework of the existing system by increasing its present performance. Here, of course, we are aware that, in the event of the conclusion of an underground nuclear test ban, the present level of the Czechoslovak seismographic network would have to be improved and its equipment modernized so that the Czechoslovak contribution to the international exchange of information in checking on any possible breach of that treaty would be in keeping with the needs of desirable detection capacity.

48. In connexion with problems of international exchange of seismic information, the question was raised whether such exchange of information should not result in establishing a special international data-processing centre, whose competence would possibly reach to the territories of the participating countries. In our opinion, already expressed in our earlier debate, such procedure is not indispensable and would, on the contrary, in no way facilitate or simplify our task. We hold the view that the processing of all data should be exclusively a matter for the individual participants in the underground test-ban treaty.

ENDC/PV.429 Pakistan/Shahi

19.8.69

pp.25-27

69. First, the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We face an impasse. The United States maintains that adequate verification of underground events — that is, the differentiation between earthquakes and man-made explosions — requires obligatory on-site inspection in addition to seismic detection and identification techniques (ENDC/PV.401, paras.19 et seq.). The stand of the Soviet Union is opposed to any such inspection. The Soviet Union insists that no international inspection in any form is required, and that "national means of detection" are adequate to reveal possible violations of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests (ENDC/PV.415, paras.108 et seq.). In spite of the artifices of Mrs. Alva Myrdal, the head of the Swedish delegation, the two super-Powers are not to be "enticed" into coming forward with more precise alternatives (ENDC/PV.415, para.40).

70. For our part we cannot conceal our admiration for the sophisticated approach in her working paper on the possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests (ENDC/242). The concept of control envisaged by Sweden — that is, to set up a deterrent to clandestine underground explosions in violation of a treaty obligation by a sufficient probability of being exposed — is, we believe, not an unrealistic one. It is conceivable to us that either super-Power, once it had accepted such an obligation, would not scrupulously honour it. It is also difficult to believe that for the sake of a comparatively minor advantage it would consider acceptable even a ten per cent risk of exposure and a complaint to the Security Council, which would gravely damage its credibility and good faith in the eyes of the whole world.

71. It is clear that the provision in article II paragraph 3(c) of the Swedish working paper of a deterrent through "verification by challenge" to invite on-site inspection of the very few seismic events which cannot be identified by improved seismic means and international exchange of seismic data, provided for in paragraph 2 of article II of the working paper, is a highly constructive move to preclude, for all practical purposes, the