

due precisely to what the Soviets have done systematically over the last twenty years with their own nuclear forces. That parity may be not even parity in certain respects, has accentuated the endemic disadvantages that the West has around the periphery of the Soviet Union, including in Western Europe, because it was the nuclear weapon that was supposed to offset those disadvantages when the Cold War began. One effect of this is that parts of western Europe are today more intimidated vis-à-vis the Soviet Union than they were in 1970. I don't want to use slogans like Finlandization, and words of that sort, because Finland may be in some way the least Finlandized of the European countries. Nevertheless, it is a fact that, among European statesmen and political leaders, the power balance admitted or not, is constantly being calculated and is constantly being factored into decisions whether to make preferential loans to East Germany or to raise questions about postponing solemnly-made decisions by the North Atlantic Alliance concerning weapons deployment or decisions by exposed NATO members not to have foreign forces on their territory and so forth. There is a sense of intimidation which affects the cohesion of the Alliance. I am using a crude word, but it is much more complicated than that. That sense of intimidation adds to a problem in the Alliance which is at once a problem and a strength in the Western Alliance in that it is a pluralistic alliance - made up of pluralistic democracies each of which has to be accommodated within this remarkable experiment in international institution building for which there is no precedent historically since we have never had sixteen pluralistic democracies forming an alliance in peace time. Compared to 1970, there is now much more uncertainty in the Western Hemisphere concerning the security situation than there was at that time. This too