were not in fact due. The drawers crossed the cheque and marked it "not negotiable." The collector had been in the habit for years past of cashing cheques received for rates at a country branch of the defendants' bank. He indorsed the cheque and obtained part of the cash for it at the defendants' branch, and the balance was applied according to his direction. The defendants received payment of the cheque at the bank on which it was drawn before the collector's fraud was discovered. The drawers of the check sought to recover the amount of it from the defendants. It was found as a fact that the defendants had received the payment in good faith and without negligence. The Court of Appeal agreed with Bigham, J., in holding that, under the circumstances, the collector was a "customer" of the defendants within the meaning of s. 82 of the Bills of Exchange Act (s. 81 of Can. Act) though he had no account with the defendants, and, also, (Williams, L.J., doubting this), that the defendants received payment of the cheque for the collector and not for themselves, and that therefore they were protected under s. 82, and were not liable to refund.

BILL OF SALE—REGISTRATION—VALIDITY—GRANTOR KNOWN ONLY BY ASSUMED NAME—NAME OF GRANTOR.

Stokes v. *Spencer* (1900) 2 Q.B. 483, was a rather unusual case touching the validity of a bill of sale. An unmarried woman named Ott lived with a man named Spencer, whose name she assumed. After his death she continued to be known as Mrs. Spencer, and whilst so known she executed a bill of sale in her name of Ott, and without any reference to her assumed name. Its validity was attacked by a creditor of Mrs. Spencer. Grantham and Channel, JJ., held, that the bill of sale was valid, as there is nothing in the English Bills of Sale Act requiring the grantor's correct name to be mentioned in the register.

CHARGING ORDER—APPLICATION TO DISCHARGE EX PARTE ORDER—LACHES—(ONT. RULE 358).

In re Deakin (1900) 2 Q.B. 489, was an application to discharge a charging order obtained by a solicitor ex parte. The motion was not made until after the lapse of two months from the service of the order, and no sufficient cause was shewn for the delay. The Court of Appeal (Webster, M.R., and Rigby and Collins, L.JJ.) agreed with Wright, J., that the application was too late, and should not be entertained.