

fore must be finite like himself under all circumstances, and never infinite in any case. In appointing the punishment of the sinner, a just God must see that it is in strict proportion to his sin: but man's sins are only finite, and endless punishment, of whatever kind, necessarily infinite; and therefore it follows, as a perfectly legitimate conclusion, that man never can incur endless misery, even should his actions or his sins be of the worst possible description.

We know that universalists will give us credit for having placed this argument, which is the sheet anchor of all their hopes, in its best possible light; and we deeply lament that an argument so plausible was ever constructed: because though faultless in structure, and seemingly sound and perfectly invulnerable in all its premises, it is nevertheless rotten to the very core; and hence the thousands who have been deceived by its fair show of truth, and who have placed their souls under its shelter, are in the sad condition of those who have made lies their refuge: to render which apparent is only necessary to observe,

That in a just appointment of punishment, the allotment is never made in proportion to the ACT of sin, but always made in degree equal to its GUILT! This *vital truth*, underlying as it does the whole argument, and yet completely ignored in its ground work, tears up on coming in to view the entire foundation, and tumbles the whole fabric into a worthless heap of ruins. It is readily admitted that sin lies at the door of every one, who is so endowed as to be justly held responsible for the morality of his conduct, wherever that conduct is either not conformed to the law of God, or violates any one of its precepts; so that sin in its most positive form, is simply the act of a finite creature, and therefore *so far as the act is concerned necessarily finite*; but, before any sin can be properly punished, it is necessary to determine the amount of *guilt* involved in it, as necessarily conceded even by universalist writers. Smith the ablest among them, in his treatise on "Divine Government," contends that guilt is to be "*measured*" in all cases, by the sinner's "*ability to understand, connected with the causes and means of knowledge*"; unfortunately, for himself and his adherents however, while Smith thus saw a part, his rule for the measurement of guilt falls *infinitely* short of the truth; for let two brothers, sons of the same father be seen contending in angry altercation, till trampling upon their common humanity, and brutally bursting the bonds of brotherhood, they mutually fall upon each other with blows—the father approaches and suddenly, with grief and anguish agitating his frame, laying his hands upon them both, he commands them to desist from their beastly strife; and pressing in between them, shoves them apart; provoked by this interference one of the sons lifts his hand from smiting his brother and instantly STRIKES HIS FATHER!!! Shocked by such a scene, human society is prepared to hurl such a wretch from its sympathies, and to allow his name to rot in infamy; while

the sentence of Heaven is heard in the utterance of a still deeper execration, proclaiming he that smiteth father or mother LET HIM DIE THE DEATH! But why all this immense increase of horror and indignation? The person who has just struck his father, is the same who the moment before smote his brother—the sin, in both cases, so far as the act is concerned, is precisely the same, it is the sin of smiting. In the moment that intervened between his sins, the sinner's "*ability to understand,*" could not have changed, nor "*the causes and means of knowledge,*" and hence, if Smith's rule for the measurement of the guilt of sin be perfect, the guilt incurred by the son in striking his father, could not be greater than that which he incurred in smiting his brother; a conclusion most glaringly erroneous; and hence truth demands another mode of measuring the guilt of sin.

The Emperor of the French may heap a thousand indignities upon a private British subject, but let him venture to treat in the same manner, the official representative of the British Empire—let him refuse the demanded explanation—and immediately the British Lion lashed to fury will roar against him; and every engine of destruction with which the strength of the British navy can invest his shores, will pour in its murderous wrath upon him—and all the millions of Britain, with every bayonet bristling—with every sword uplifted—and with every gun open-mouthed, will fall upon him in destructive wrath; to avenge an indignity offered to *one* individual, while the nation takes no notice of a *thousand* indignities offered to another! Why is this?

In the case of the son's transferring his blow from his brother to his father; and in the case of the Emperor's transferring his indignity from a private subject to the British plenipotentiary; it is clearly obvious, that the enormous increase of guilt consequent on the transfer in each instance is not attributable to any change in the ability or circumstances of the offender, and *still less* to any change in the *act* of transgression; and hence the cause of the overwhelming increase of guilt observable in each case, must be sought for in something connected with the relative position of the respective parties sinned against.

The position of the father, let it be observed, is that of the founder, ruler, head and representative of the family—that every member reverence and honour him, is essential to the harmony and well being of the household, and the same being true of all the families of the earth—this connected with the fact that irreverence is diffusive in its nature, susceptible of being spread by example, renders an act of direct irreverence shown to the father of any family, by any member thereof, a positive injury to every family upon earth; and hence the fearful enormity of the guilt incurred by the son who lifts his hand against his father; the guilt of striking a brother, great as it unquestionably is, sinks in the comparison into utter insignificance. The British minister at the court of France, is the direct representative of the British nation, and hence of every individual composing it.