

## INTRODUCTION

Volumes 7 and 8 of this series covered the Second World War prior to the entry of Japan and the United States. The present volume deals with the evolution of Canadian policy during the middle years of the war, from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, until the end of 1943. During those years, attention shifted from working out the bases of Canada's participation, as "a belligerent second only to Britain as a Commonwealth military power" (Volume 8, p. ix), to an attempt to define this country's place in an Allied war effort dominated by much larger nations. That effort was important not only because Canadians were concerned about the conduct of the war itself but also because precedents were being established which would profoundly affect their interests once peace returned. It was a time for testing Canada's sovereignty and for determining the recognition which this country might expect for its contribution to victory.

During the middle years of the war, the organization of the Department of External Affairs did not change from that described in the Introduction to Volume 7 (p. xiii). Because of their domestic ramifications, the most important changes in diplomatic representation (Chapter I) undoubtedly were the termination of relations with the Vichy government of France and the appointment of a representative to deal with the Free French, first in London and later in Algiers. Otherwise, the Canadian government, concerned about the shortage of qualified personnel, sought to avoid proliferation of diplomatic missions, although some pressures proved irresistible. In addition, there were two initiatives related to particular goals of Canadian policy. Plans were made to appoint a High Commissioner to India in the hope of contributing to the constitutional evolution of that country within the Commonwealth, but they were not carried out. To promote Canadian interests in the United States, the first consulate general was opened in New York. Changing conventions of diplomacy, combined with a keener sensitivity to considerations of status, led to the decision to raise the legations exchanged between Canada and foreign countries to the embassy level, beginning with the United States. Reflecting as they did the growing complexity of Canada's international relationships, these changes — especially the establishment of the consulate general — suggested the need for examination of the roles of the Department of External Affairs and the Trade Commissioner service of the Department of Trade and Commerce in order to avoid conflict between the two services and confusion over lines of authority. Consequently, an interdepartmental committee was established which studied the problem and made recommendations for the co-ordination of activities.

The overriding preoccupation of those concerned with Canadian external policy in 1942 and 1943 was, of course, the conduct of the war (Chapter II). Pearl Harbor ended the diplomatic manoeuvres described in Chapters VI and VII of Volume 8 and added a new theatre of war, of which Canadians soon had bitter experience at Hong Kong. It also brought suspicion on the Japanese-Canadian community and suggested that its future might become an important issue in external relations. Yet Canada was not deeply involved in the Pacific theatre in 1942 and 1943, and it was the other consequence of Pearl Harbor, the entry into the war of the United States, that had the greater impact on this