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offence when their requests, improper in themselves, or unfit to be granted under existing circumstances, are refused; and deter them from preferring numberless claims, the rejection of which would have drawn upon him the resentment of disappointed pride. In filling up inferior official situations, and in recommending persons to his Sovereign, when the post which he occupies authorizes such a step, to be placed at the head of high executive departments, he will make choice of men, whose abilities and attainments are suited to the functions which they will have to discharge. He will seek, he will reward merit, in whatever line it may be found, and in whatever situation it is employed!"

The operation of such principles and such policy in the administration of the Government, would be like a well-spring of life to the country—to the virtuous principles and aspirations of its rising youth, and to the enterprise, harmony and happiness of all classes of its population; whilst a government propelled by the unhallowed stimulus of exclusive partyism, is like the burning lava of sterility and death, upon the best intellectual energies and moral feelings and social happiness of a community, emitting its volcanic eruptions in all the diversified forms of party association, party passion, party violence, party proscriptions,—and not unfrequently party rioting, bloodshed and murder. When the life pulse of the government is partyism, it will beat to the extremities of the body politic, and partyism in every variety of secret and public combination, will spread throughout the whole population, and *statutes* themselves will be as cobwebs against its existence and even prevalence. When government announces party favouritism and party exclusion as the principle of its administration, it is itself no better than a political party confederacy armed with dreadful power; its oaths of secrecy are but the counterpart of the secret oaths of other political confederacies; its own policy would be serving the seed broadcast, of which all party confederacies would be the legitimate fruit; it might even legislate against some of them, but itself would be the fostering parent of them all; party policy being the rule of its action, party-spirit would be the life-blood of its existence, and with the death of that spirit would be its own dissolution; its moral power—the most essential means of good in a government—would be no more than the moral power of any other selfish party combination; the law in its hands would be felt as a tyranny, and the executive power an instrument of party despotism, only more regarded than any other party despotism, not because it was more just or virtuous, but because it was more powerful; under its sway not only would party combinations and societies, secret and public, increase and multiply, but the noisy worthless partizan would be the great man, and the intelligent worthy man would be the obscure man; party cunning would be on the high way to executive employment and virtuous industry the sure path of obscurity; and the teacher must ap

prize his pupils, that under the existing system of government they would not be encouraged, patronized and rewarded, according to their virtues, their attainments, their abilities, their industry, their love of justice and law—but according to their party confederacy, their party zeal, party skill, and all the arts and qualifications of the party gamester.

In illustration of the truth of these remarks, I appeal to the growth of party associations, secret and public in Canada, since the hour when it was fully understood and acknowledged by the late Councillors that party policy was their rule of government. I appeal to the revival and the character of party spirit in the country, which is as the zephyr before the gale, in comparison of what will be, if such an unprincipled policy be substituted for the principle of Provincial policy in the administration of the government. I appeal to the party combinations and party manoeuvres in these sections of the United States, where the executive power is only the breath of party and where party is the main-spring in the whole machinery of government; where lynch law, and mob power is stronger than executive power. I appeal to the late riots in Philadelphia—the natural spawn of an exclusive-party-policy-administration of the government advocated—to the moral weakness of the executive authorities there—the powerlessness of the law—the necessity and even inefficiency of military interference. I appeal to the sentiments and wariness of the late President of the United States, as quoted in the last number. I appeal to the denunciations of the above quoted Dr. Wayland—to the testimony and the lamentations of the most able statesman and writers, and most estimable characters in the American Republic. I appeal, finally, to the unwitting testimony of the Toronto Associationists themselves.—In the address of Mr. Hincks to the electors of Frontenac, which the Associationists ordered to be re-printed and circulated by their agents in illustration of the doctrine earnestly advocated, that "the vacant offices should be filled up by men of their own party," (p. 2,) a quotation is introduced, to show that the "distribution of patronage should be so wielded as to secure the active support of the friends of the government, and weaken the party of their opponents,"—(p. 4) That quotation concludes thus:—"A man of ability in Prussia, without connexions, has a much better chance of getting on, if he devotes himself to the public service than in England; but at the same time, the chances of such a person being advanced are infinitely greater here, [England,] than in the United States. In the latter everything is sacrificed to party considerations; and the most splendid talents and capacity to render great public services would never advance their possessor one step on the ladder of promotion if he happened to be of a different party from that in favour at the time, or to want party support. The reason is, that in England Parliamentary influence predominates merely, whereas in America it is everything; and everything