

is still true to say that if any member of NATO withdrew—Canada, Denmark or any other member—it would be able to withdraw. If NATO were abolished tomorrow you would have a genuine dismantling of an alliance. Therefore, the two cannot be argued about in the same sense at all. Is that not true?

Professor McNaught: I agree with your analysis so far as it suggests that the Warsaw Pact is considerably different in kind from NATO. As you suggest, it is far more a diplomatic window dressing for a military containment system but we have heard it argued, and argued strongly, that one of the two principal reasons for maintaining NATO is to contain Germany, and indeed that is the argument I have heard put most frequently and persuasively when talking, at least in private, to members of the Department of External Affairs. It is an argument in terms of good faith that I think they hold in good faith but with which I think I disagree.

I think what you are presupposing in talking about the permanence of the Warsaw Pact, whether or not NATO disbanded, is no change in the foreseeable future anywhere in Eastern Europe. I think obviously there have been signs of considerable change, considerable liberalization, from time to time and while it is true that just such a change was suppressed militarily by Russia, it does not follow that it always will be. A suppression of the level of insecurity, fear, and the rest of it, the tension in Western Europe, might well lead to a reduction in Russia's feeling of need to maintain a purely military containment.

So far as a NATO member's withdrawing from the pact in Western Europe is concerned, if she just withdrew militarily you are probably right that nothing would happen, but if she withdrew—let us take Italy as a hypothetical example—to become a communist state I for one would not bet that there would be no intervention.

Mr. Lewis: Well, perhaps I agree with you on the latter. I do not read present day history as presenting that kind of likelihood in Italy or France where the Communist parties are the strongest at the moment. And I do not agree with the proposition that NATO is valuable in containing West Germany. I was not in Parliament at the time, but I happen to be one who opposed the rearming of Germany in the first place.

But that is irrelevant, is it not, Professor McNaught, to the present situation, and you have taken me to the second point that I want to discuss with you for a moment.

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Is not Germany the real problem in Europe at the moment? If one talks about spheres of influence

and ignores Germany and the very explosive situation that that divided country presents to Europe it seems to me that one is not reading modern history adequately.

I am not impressed by the suggestion Mr. MacLean made about Russia gobbling up the Baltic states. I have a memory that we agreed to that gobbling up. I forget whether it was the Potsdam or the Yalta Treaty, but we said: "You go ahead and gobble them up," and we signed a treaty to that effect.

All of that is history, and one can criticize it, but the fact remains that you have (a) a divided Germany, (b) a divided Berlin and (c) a situation in which there is still no peace treaty in Europe.

The fact also remains that you have a determination on the part of the eastern European nations, the Soviet Union and all its allies, or satellites, whichever you like, to keep Germany divided unless it can come under Communist control; and the United States, Britain and France and their allies, or satellites, if you like, determined to keep Germany divided unless it not be a Communist state.

In that constantly boiling situation, with threats and counter-threats about Berlin, stuck in the middle of the Soviet zone, surely it is not unreasonable to expect that the western nations of Europe, aware of that situation and contiguous to the immediate dangers, would feel a pressure on them to have a military alliance, or some kind of alliance, to protect themselves. Any worry about the situation, and I am sharing with you a concern rather than a finished opinion, is that although I think it is true that the Soviet Union is not interested in going west of Czechoslovakia, excluding Germany, it is not at all true, I suggest to you, that the Soviet Union and its allies are not interested in going at some point into the rest of Germany—certainly ejecting the western presence in Berlin, which is a crazy situation, anyhow, and eventually going beyond that.

This is the kind of situation in which it seems to me that to condemn the western European Nations in NATO, whatever Canada's role may be, and to condemn them for taking this NATO step in 1948 and hanging on to it since, does not have very great validity in the present situation.

I am sorry to have taken so long, but I wanted to explain fully what was concerning me.

Professor McNaught: To take your last point first, I have not condemned them for taking the step in 1948 or 1949. It seems to me that the tension of the world was understandable then, even though there was still a monopoly of "the bomb" in American hands.

It seems to me that to defend NATO as a military alliance which offers precarious security to Norway,