

in these nuclear-test talks, that this conference is going to be a failure. This, I submit, is a very bad situation, and one which I hope will be clarified by the correspondents of all our countries. As a start, it would be most helpful to receive a report on these informal talks which have been taking place on this subject from the three participants. Countries which do not possess nuclear weapons cannot put a stop to these tests; however, we can and do appeal to the nuclear states to do everything in their power to see that a solution is not further delayed.

Third Type of Problem

There is a third category of problems in which the extent and the nature of the disagreement between the two sides are far from clear. As representatives will have noticed, I referred earlier to cases where there is disagreement but where that disagreement is clear-cut and everyone understands what it is. What is required to resolve this third category of differences is, in the first instance, an intensive discussion which will demonstrate precisely what the position of the two sides are. We must find out exactly the position taken by the two sides. To avoid continued misunderstanding, the respective interests of the two sides should be brought into the light of day and the possibility of an accommodation of views examined in good faith.

One of the most fundamental problems requiring this kind of examination is the question of verification. Canada's willingness to contribute to a verified system of disarmament has been demonstrated by the offer which my Government has made, and which still stands, to throw open its northern areas for inspection in exchange for comparable rights in corresponding areas of Soviet territory.

In the opinion of my delegation, the best way to achieve a realistic solution of the problem of verification is to avoid any further discussion in the abstract. We should avoid abstract debates on the world "verification". Instead, there should be careful examination of each measure of disarmament, together with the specific verification procedures to ensure that all states carry out that particular disarmament measure. In other words, let us take a measure of disarmament and with it study the verification for that measure, rather than studying verification in general.

Let us take an example from the Soviet draft treaty to illustrate my point. Article 5 provides for the elimination of certain means of delivering nuclear weapons and for the cessation of the production. Paragraph 3 of this article provides that the implementation of these measures should be verified by inspectors of the international disarmament organization. The language of the Soviet draft treaty suggests that substantial inspection would be allowed over this measure of disarmament. What we need to clarify is how much the inspectors are to be allowed to see, and the conditions under which they would carry