the Indian position, which in both cases perhaps reflects their sensitivity to issues of status and subordination (a legacy of colonialism), and their relative regional importance. Not surprisingly, one element that drives the more multilateral impulses of the ASEAN states is precisely their orientation towards China, the "natural" regional hegemon.

These kinds of orientations, derived from respective historical experiences in different regions, have a direct impact on how states approach NACD issues, and how they prefer to tackle them. In China's case, it appears willing to discuss security issues in the Asia-Pacific only so as not to be left out or isolated; it exhibits a powerful preference, however, for bilateral "hub-and-spoke" arrangements with its neighbours that keep Chinese policy at the center. (This may also be a real motivation behind Chinese participation in global multilateral forums.) In India's case, its security policy "remains chained to the notion that bilateral advantages outweigh any gains that might be derived from dealing with neighbours on a multilateral basis."[9] And as noted above, the Middle Eastern region witnesses all parties to the conflict relying strongly on ties with external parties to reinforce their conflicting claims or buttress their legitimacy.

Cultural Elements of Diplomacy and Negotiation

The specific cultural elements that appear in the context of diplomacy and negotiation are more difficult to untangle, for it is easy to conclude from a *prima facie* examination of the various cases that these cultural elements were purely stylistic, and not at all substantial. There are three reasons for this. First, cultural elements that would otherwise affect negotiation can be (as noted above) "drowned out" when the legacy of the conflict, or other historical perceptions, prevent the parties from engaging in a positive-sum dialogue. In other words, when negotiations are not "real," cultural factors are irrelevant. Second, the existence of a "common professional culture of diplomacy" may mute the influences of deeper cultural elements.[10] Finally, when these factors do come into play, they are notoriously difficult to pin down with any precision. The literature is full of stories about how to serve tea, when not to refuse gifts, which doors not to walk through, and what colours to wear, but these are usually unrelated to the substance of what is under discussion in any international negotiation.[11] Few studies, however, have attempted to show

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[9] Latham, 116.

[10] See Edmund Glenn, D. Wikmeyer, and K. Stevenson, "Cultural Styles of Persuasion," *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 1:3 (1977), 52-65; Geert Hofstede, "Cultural Predictors of National Negotiating Styles," in Frances Mautner-Markhof, ed., *Processes of International Negotiations*, (Boulder: Westview, 1989), 193-201.

[11] Although there is a substantial literature in other areas, such as business or sociology, where the interpersonal dimension of negotiations perhaps matters much more. See, for example, Stephen E. Weiss and William Stripp, "Negotiating with Foreign Businesspersons: An Introduction for Americans," *Business Negotiations Across Cultures*, working paper 1 (New York: New York University Graduate School of Business Administration, 1985). See also the *Journal of International Business Studies* or *The International Journal of Intercultural Relations*.