Nonetheless, assuming North Korea's decision to stabilize the situation, the Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula, signed and ratified in 1992, provides a starting point. This calls for using nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes and renouncing possession of reprocessing and enrichment facilities. Both Koreas agree not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons. Mutual, agreed inspections are to be used to verify compliance. If North Korea accepts its responsibilities under this declaration and under the NPT, there will be numerous opportunities for the United States, Canada and the United Nations to make available co-operative monitoring techniques.

Should political conditions improve, bilateral conventional arms control may become more practical, as well. In the context of new political ties with the United States, Canada, Japan and others, North Korea could be willing to engage in serious negotiations on limiting conventional military capabilities and CBMs. Efforts to reduce forces near the demilitarized zone could be a first step. An exchange of information on force levels, force structure and force posture would be useful; notification of military exercises and limits on size and duration of exercises would also lead to greater transparency. South Korea has proposed a number of transparency measures which might be strengthened by co-operative monitoring, for example, observations of military exercises, military data and intelligence sharing, direct communication lines with field armies, peaceful utilization of the DMZ, and redeployment of major weapons systems and troops to the rear.

Future Expansion of the Open Skies Treaty

The Preamble of the Open Skies Treaty, signed in 1992, explicitly refers to the possibility of employing overflights "to facilitate monitoring of compliance with existing or future arms control agreements and to strengthen the capacity for conflict prevention and crisis management." There has been considerable interest in the use of this confidence-building measure because of its potential application to peace operations and regional stabilizing activities and because of the synergies inherent in combining monitoring from aircraft with ground- and space-based monitoring.

Exploiting Synergies to Expand the Role and Effectiveness of the United Nations

In the period of the Cold War, verification, more particularly effective, intrusive verification, was considered the province of arms control agreements. In the post-Cold War world in which control of arms is a multinational challenge, verification is an essential requirement of all agreements that seek to preserve global and regional security. As the institution that most closely embodies the concept of global rule of law, the United Nations should take a more active role in capitalizing on the synergies associated with arms control verification, confidence-building measures and peace operations. Taking on these responsibilities is not a new assignment; indeed, the fact-finding associated with preventive diplomacy can be seen as a variant of the information-gathering activities associated with confidence-building measures, and the experiences associated with UNSCOM inspections will provide useful lessons for future global and regional agreements where there is not full co-operation on the part of every signatory.

In a report tabled at the 1990 session of the General Assembly, a UN Group of Experts argued that the UN's virtually universal membership made it well suited to consider the possibilities associated with six verificationrelated activities: data collection, promotion of exchanges between experts and diplomats, expansion of the fact-finding role of the Secretary-General, use of aircraft for verification purposes, use of satellites, and potential development of an international verification system.¹



Study on the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification, United Nations Report No. 20, document no. A/45/372 (New York, 1991).