

nuclear warheads and delivery systems to between 3,000 and 3,500 each. All MIRVed ICBMs will be eliminated and SLBM warheads reduced to 1700-1750. The number of warheads counted for heavy bombers will be the number of nuclear weapons they are actually equipped to carry.

- Further reductions are unlikely without the participation of the other declared nuclear powers.
 - Follow-on START negotiations involving the five declared nuclear powers will be initiated, but the negotiations will be protracted. It will be extremely difficult to achieve agreed-upon levels of nuclear warheads and delivery systems which take into account current and future asymmetrical force levels and perceived requirements. While no formal agreements are likely to be reached in this time frame, reciprocal and unilateral actions by Russia and the United States resulting in further reductions are possible.
6. Thresholds of the TTBT and the PNET will be lowered, the quotas on nuclear tests in the United States and Russia will be reduced, and, before 2002, a global moratorium on nuclear testing will be in place. Fissionable materials will no longer be produced for weapons purposes in either country, but a surplus of such materials will be available. This surplus will lead to serious concern about possible illegal sales or diversions of weapons-grade materials. Serious negotiations on a CTB will be undertaken.
 7. American-Russian consultations on a Global Protection System (GPS) will result in the establishment of a multi-national ballistic missile/space launch early warning center. Space-based interceptors will not be part of the system.
 8. The ABM Treaty will be clarified, modified, and amended to permit effective theater missile defenses (TMD). TMD will be supported

by space-based sensors. Even a Treaty-compliant ground-based national missile defense (NMD) for coverage of the United States may not survive defense budget cuts and political resistance.

9. Deployments of theater missile defenses (TMD) will be underway, but such deployments will not in themselves constrain proliferation of ballistic missiles. They will affect a country's possible employment of ballistic missiles.

Regional Concerns

The end of the Cold War resulted in many nations losing their status as "client states." These countries must reconsider their national security requirements, which will affect their efforts to acquire military weapons. Although the threat of a deliberate attack on any country from Russia has all but disappeared, Russia and other Republics of the former Soviet Union appear to be willing to sell advanced weapons, technology, and knowledge for economic reasons. This will further complicate efforts to constrain proliferation of weapons of mass impact and advanced delivery systems.

The post-war UNSCOM inspections of Iraq led the United States and Canada, among many other democracies, to place special efforts on those regions where the dangers of proliferation remain acute, notably, the Middle East, South-East Asia, and the Korean Peninsula. The following assumptions speak to regional concerns in the years 1992-2002.

10. Iraq will continue its clandestine programs to acquire nuclear weapons and to enhance its chemical weapons capabilities and advanced delivery systems. (Some believe that Iraq still possesses up to 200 SCUD missiles.) Permanent monitoring may be required to deter, and possibly detect, facilities dedicated to these programs. Iran will continue its small nuclear weapons program, with Chinese assistance in building a nuclear power plant. India and Pakistan will continue to pursue the nuclear option in a more

