

the West be increased. From the standpoint of the heavy industrial and defense production establishments, the propaganda apparatus, and old-guard Stalinists, the moral-political unity of Soviet society would be impaired, and with it their claims to resources, prestige, and relevance. The wedge of ideological coexistence would be driven deeper into the Soviet system, with the result that reformism, disorder, and vulnerability to imperialist penetration and disruption could all be expected to increase. And in Eastern Europe these problems would be posed even more sharply. Accordingly, as Suslov put it shortly before Brezhnev's concession on exchanges, there must be no reconciliation between socialism and capitalism; it is necessary to remain hostile to reformism; and the ideological and political intrigues of the imperialists must be frustrated.⁷⁴

The principal spear-carrier for the conservative coalition on the question of exchanges is Yuri Zhukov who, as we have seen, favours a neo-Stalinist adaptation of Genoa tactics to promote limited cooperation with Western Europe only. On the last day of Kissinger's discussions with Brezhnev in September 1972, he published an attack on the activities of "NATO wreckers," "cold warriors," and Chinese enemies of cooperation in Europe.⁷⁵ Stating imperiously that hostile forces retained powerful positions in determining Western policy toward the CSCE, he implied that no concessions should