

situations. Indeed, this comparative dimension added greatly to the cogency of his books and articles, and to their appeal to the Japanese who many tended to regard as utterly unique.

Contrary to the repeated claims by Barros, (125) Norman's career was in clear decline as he moved from American and Far Eastern Division to Information Division to the High Commissioner post in New Zealand. Only with Cairo in 1956 did it resume an upward course. New Zealand (1954-56) presented little challenge, but Norman was so trusted that it might have been a golden opportunity to practice as an "agent of influence." The little Dominion had rarely if ever received a diplomat as knowledgeable as Herbert Norman, and likable too. He was close to everyone who counted and even, it is said, invited to sit in on the occasional cabinet meeting. New Zealand, Norman reported, was shifting away from mother Britain and becoming a close ally of the United States; it is not clear if he welcomed this trend. His best dispatches were sociological studies of Pacific islands other than New Zealand. Barros, Chapman Pincher, William Stevenson, and Peter Worthington, all claim that Norman was working for the KGB while in New Zealand. It would be interesting to learn how.

The pace changed in Cairo, and conceivably the opportunity to make mischief. As least that was the alarmist view of the Senators on the Internal Security Subcommittee. With the Suez Crisis, the focus of world attention had shifted to Cairo. When the Committee learned that Norman was in that city, and that his "prison release" accomplice, John Emmerson, was in nearby Beirut - and that the two had even lunched together, "consternation broke out." Committee Counsel Robert Morris then broke the rules, and an explicit promise, by releasing the testimony, including ancient, unsupported allegations that Norman was a Communist. His probable purpose, Barros stated, without a trace of criticism, was "... to embarrass the Canadian Government into removing [Norman] from the sensitive Cairo and Beirut posts." (125) If removal was the object, how well "Judge" Morris succeeded! (see below )

The Suez crisis brought many journalists to Cairo, and Norman, as one of the three most admired and influential Ambassadors, was in demand. The other two, the Ambassadors of India and the United States, were his close friends. A British diplomat said that Norman had learned more about the Middle East in a few months than he had learned in ten years. He quickly won Nasser's confidence and relatively easy access. This proved critical as the charismatic young dictator was notoriously prickly and impulsive. It took all of Norman's tact and knowledge to persuade him to cooperate with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and, in particular, to agree to a substantial Canadian contribution. Because of their British