## NOTES AND QUERIES.

BY G.W.

DRILI .

The Herse Guards has recently furnished us with an addition to the Field Service (Batt See p 281) viz – The formation of column from line on a central company, all the remaining companies moving in rear This manœuvre, although consistent with the principles involved in the new system of Doployments, can scarcely be considered a very important addition. And it may be remarked that, so far as I em aware, we are indebted solely to the VelleNTEER REVIEW, for the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the order, for I do not remember to have seen any General Order in the Gazette

At p. 345 (Echellon movements) we are told that the cumberous and tedious process of placing companies at their proper angles in echellon by the wheel of coverers from the 7th file is applicable only to Instruction Parades, and that such manœuvers should, on general occasiors, be excuted on movogble pivots. It is therefore somewat remark able that no provision has been made in Section 33 to extend the principle to the for mation of line from open columns at the halt.

Something like the following inserted in Section 33, would, I venture to think, be quite as useful a manœuvre as the one just promulgated.

An open column forming line on the front company from the halt, on moveable pivots. In this movement the caution will be, on the move—form line on the front company —the commanding officer will then give the order remaming companies—on the move left (or right) wheel—the whole—quick march. On this command the front company will move straight to the front, halting by command of its Captain on the word forward—given by the commanding officer to the remaining companies when they have completed the eighth of a circle. In all other respects the movement will be performed as laid down in No. 5 cf this Section No. 33.

# VOLUNTEER ENCAMPMENTS.

Perhaps a hint of a mild evolution or two in strict accordance with existing regulations may help to pass the time while the military authorities decide when they will address themselves to the solution of the broad problems which lie before them.

I notice in the published accounts of the recent Cavalry and Artillery Camp, the repetition of an error which struck me, as being a dehberate waste of opportunity for acquiring a particularly useful species of practical knowledge. I allude to the tents being pitched by the Regulars for the Volunteers. Volunteers do not require (howover kindly the intentions of the Military Authorities) to be treated as holiday soldiers. If a volunteer is worth his salt he goes into camp to learn all that he can cram tion the limited time allowed him, and he

### THE VOLUNTEER REVIEW:

ought to have the opportunity afforded him of practically working out every detail of camp life. Supervision and instruction by Regulars is a boon, but the Voluniers should do the work themselves. It was the same thing at Thorola. Whenever a Volunteer Battalion goes out of Camp, it should be made to strike its own tents, and whenever a Volunteer Battation goes into Camp it should be made to pitch them for itself. fhere were dozens of Cadets at Laprairie in 1865, who would have known nothing of the routine of pitching a camp, if they had not gone down to the camping ground of the Regulars, when they arrived for the field day and taken notes of their proceedings. 1 have not yet procured Major Scoble's work but I trust, for the sake of volunteer officers generally, it contains the requisite detail for pitching a camp.

## THE RELATIVE MERITS OF GAVALRY AND INFANTRY.

The opinion that Infantry in good order is indestructible by equally good Cavalry is one which has of late years, especially since Waterloo, obtained almost universal credence, at least among infantrymen. This idea is, to a certain extent borne out by the axiom laid down in the Field Exercise, that an infantry soldier, properly trained, should be a match for a cavalry soldier. The charges of the Mamelukes on the French squares in Egypt porhaps scarcely bear out the theory, the conditions of descipline being unequal. Neither does the breaking of the Persian squares at Kooshab, for a like reason, give to the reverse proposition.

The battle of Waterloo itself certainly afforded strong ovidence in favor of Infan-"try, as, although "Napoleon's horsemen "inundated the field, drove the artillerymen "from their guns, careered in the intervals "of the squares, and seemed masters of the "ground, they failed to make a permament impression."

A certain sanction is also lent to the opinions of those who believe in the innate superiorty of steady infantry. by many records of the latter part of the middle ages. When it first became apparent that a well organized foot soldiery was at all capable of hold. ing its own against the cavalry of the daya cavalry, be it also remembered peculiarly formidable from its iron weight, and length of weapon, to an infantry as yet innocent of fire arms. The following passages from Prescott's account of the campaigns in Italy of Gousalvo de Cordova, (the great Captain) against the armies of Charles VIII of France. will perhaps, in this respect, be not uninteresting.

"The astonishing success of the French "was still more imputable to the free use "and admirable organization of their infan-"try, whose strength lay in the Swiss mer-"cenaries. Machiavelli ascribes the misfor-"tunes of his nation chiefly to its exclusive "reliance on cavalry. This service, during "the whole of the middle ages, was consid-

### NC VENBES

"ered among the European nations the "most important; the horse being styled "1 y way of eminence "The Battle." The "mer prable conflict of Charles the Bold "with the Swiss Mountaineers, however, in "which the latter broke in pieces the cele "brated Burgundian ordonance, constituting "the finest body of chivalry of the age, le monstrated the capacity of infantry, and "the Italian Wars at length fully re estat "Ished its ancient superiority"

. The Swiss were formed into Battalion varying from three to eight thousand men 'each. They wore little defensive armer, and their principal weapon was the Juke eighteeen feet long. Formed into these solid battalions, which, bristling with spean all around, received the technical appel " lation of the hedgehoy, they presented ania "vulnerable front on overy quarter. In the " level field with free scope for action, they "bore down all opposition, and received an "shaken the most desperate charges of the "steel clad cavalry on their terrible array of "pikes. They were too unwieldy, however, " for rapid or complicated manu uvers, they "were easily disconcerted by any unforeseen "impediment. or irregularity of the ground, and the event proved that the Spanish for armed with its swords and bucklers, b "breaking in under the long pikes of it "enemy, could succeed in bringing him to "close action, where his formidable weapon "was of no avail. It was repeating the m "cient lesson of the Roman legion and the "Macedonian phalanx."

We are further told, in a note, that Peij bius, in his minuto account of this celebra ed military institution of the Greeks, (the Phalanx) has recapitulated nearly all the advantages and defects imputed to the Sories herisson (hedge hog) by modern Europea writers. It is also stated that Gonsalyo, whe however, was weak in heavy cavalry, can fully avoided direct encounter with the dreaded Swiss battalions.

It is obvious that the defects incident a what, both in antiquity, and in the muddle ages, was nevertheless a magnificient infotry, are entirely done away by the reshmobility of modern battalions; while there lative strength of cavalry may be said tokdiminished, not only by the introduction d arms of precision, but also by the want d that comparative invulnerability, which a the absence of firearms, must have addeds much to the confidence of the steeldd squadrons of chivalry.

So far therefore a reference to former iods would seem to strengthen the opin of those who maintain the superiority of fantry in the present day. Neither da Col. Hamley in his succinct resume of the operations of war advance anything torvalidate that idea as relates to Infacts against Cavalry unaided by other arms. It the contrary he says "Good infantry the "has generally, in the wars of the press "century, successfully resisted can's