

dent was due to the neglect of the tenant to use the appliance provided, as in case these questions were answered affirmatively the defendant would not be liable. The court also took occasion to express the opinion that in *Sandford v. Clarke*, 21 Q.B.D. 398, they had proceeded on a wrong ground in assuming that a weekly tenancy comes to an end at the end of each week, and, on the contrary, they consider that it continues from week to week until determined by some notice; but how long that notice should be they do not say. The reporter in a note refers to an Irish case, *Harvey v. Copeland*, 30 L.R. Ir. 412, where it was held that a reasonable notice was necessary, and that a reasonable notice means a week's notice.

PARLIAMENT—PETITION TO PARLIAMENT—REFUSAL OF MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT TO PRESENT PETITION—MANDAMUS.

*Chaffers v. Goldsmid*, (1894) 1 Q.B. 186, was a rather singular action. The plaintiff had forwarded to the defendant, who was a member of parliament for the division in which the plaintiff was a voter, a petition complaining of the conduct of one of Her Majesty's judges. The defendant had declined to present it, and thereupon the action was brought, praying a mandamus to compel the defendant to present the petition. Collins, J., affirmed an order of a master striking out the plaintiff's statement of claim as frivolous; and, on appeal, Wills and Grantham, JJ., affirmed the order, holding that there is no right of action in a person desirous of petitioning parliament to compel any particular member to present it.

PRACTICE—JUDGMENT FOR COMMON LAW CAUSE OF ACTION—SEQUESTRATION—ORD. XLII., R. 3 (ONT. RULES 862, 883).

*Hulbert v. Cathcart*, (1894) 1 Q.B. 244, carries the law as laid down in *Ex parte Nelson, Re Hoare*, 14 Ch.D. 41, one step further. In this case the plaintiff had recovered a judgment for a debt against a married woman. He subsequently obtained an order in Chambers directing the defendant to pay the amount of the judgment within a time limited, and in default that a sequestration should issue against the defendant's separate property, from which order the defendant appealed, and Wills and Wright, JJ., unanimously rescinded the order, holding that there was no jurisdiction to make it. This decision agrees with *London and Canadian Loan and Agency Co. v. Merritt*, 32 C.P. 375, and seems