

lates all concerns of man as a social being—his rights, his duties, his capacities, and his incapacities in regard to persons and to things. It is not a thing of the day or the product of any one age. It has gone on with the social development of the people; it cannot be read without a reference to the past to explain a conception or to interpret a rule, and so in the proper study of the law, history comes in as a prominent factor, the history, in fact, of a nation's civilization. Let us take as an instance the law relating to the tenure of land in England. What a light it throws on the structure of society at every epoch! It introduces us almost at once to that remarkable institution which, for something like a thousand years, formed the framework of society and government in Europe—the Feudal System.

And the sources of interest and instruction are further widened when we enter upon the law of archaic times. In this field, opened by Sir Henry Maine in his "Ancient Law," we become acquainted with the ideas that prevailed in the earliest stages of historic man. The field becomes more important and still richer in results, when in his "Early History of Institutions" the comparative method of investigation yields lessons adapted to the present time. When he calls attention to the fact of the political ideas of a race, and its ideas of property also, being bound up with the notions of family interdependency, of collective ownership, and of natural subjection to patriarchal rule, law lends a lesson of profound importance to the statesman and legislator. So much for the character of the ideas; now, how is it adapted to train the reason?

In his essay on "The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence," Mr. Austin considers that the study of the rationale of law was as well, or nearly as well, fitted as that of mathematics to exercise the mind to the mere process of deduction from given hypotheses, and he cites the opinion of so great an authority as Leibnitz in his support. And with regard to an accurate and ready perception of analogies and processes of inference founded upon analogy, the study of law, if rationally pursued, was, in Mr. Austin's opinion, superior to mathematics, or any of the physical sciences in which mathematics are extensively appli-