here. There is nothing therefore in these sections to give us expressly the power that we are here called upon to exercise, and we are driven to inquire what is the proper course for us to pursue under the present circumstances. I do not think that the mode is important. The great object is to notify the opposite party what it is intended to ask the Court to do. Here a rule *nisi* was taken out, and although there is no exactly similar process in the Supreme Court, if it answers the desired object there is nothing to prevent us from adopting it. There would be no question about our power to make a rule to regulate the practice in this respect, and I do not see that there is anything to prevent us from adopting any manner of settling these disputes which is not contrary in principle to the proceedings of the Supreme Court. Where proceedings in that Court are calculated to embarrass a party the Court will strike out or amend them. Under these circumstances I think we have the power to do the same thing. We consider that the putting of these unnecessary complaints in the answer is calculated to embarrass the trial of the proper issues, and that such a proceeding is in opposition to the main judgment delivered in this case. We there decided that recriminatory charges could not be made, and that corrupt practices, where the seat was not claimed, could only be inquired into on the trial before the Judge in the performance of his duty under the 20th Section. We believe that that decision is sound, though if we had seen anything in the meantime to change our opinion, I have no doubt that my colleagues and myself would have been willing to adopt the course that was shown to be preferable. Not having seen anything to alter our views, we are of the opinion that this rule must be made absolute, and inasmuch as this objectionable clause was introduced after the judgment that we delivered on the main question arising on the preliminary objections, and as the application of the Petitioner has been wholly successful, we think we are bound by these circumstances to give costs. The reason why no costs were given on the rule in *Doull vs Carmichael*, was that neither party was wholly successful. If the application of the Petitioner in that case had been limited to the portion of the answer that we struck out, we would have felt bound to give costs.