

stant intercourse and a permanent official representation at the Imperial capital—with the whole system of our English business expanded, its banks, trades, companies, agencies, communicating and acting together within the Empire as they now do within Great Britain—we foresee in Federalism a promise of development for our wealth hitherto unconceived by the most dreamy worshipper of Plutus. And the possibility has been concluded by the steam and telegraph, which have destroyed the obstacles of distance. The Colonies also would gain their advantage from the new relation, in the ready inflow of capital for all purposes of development.

Not only in this way would the wealth of the Empire be quickened into more general circulation, but from the Imperial point of view Federalism promises to settle in the happiest way the difficulties arising through the unequal incidence of the burthens of Imperial expense. I do not here advert to the National Debt—a subject which would need special arrangements under any system of federation. One of the prime conditions of federation would be that the charges in matters of common interest should be equally borne, those of more immediate concern to any member of the confederacy being left to the adjudication of its local Government. Under this arrangement Englishmen in England could no longer complain that they were unfairly taxed for the benefit of Englishmen in America, or Africa, or Australia; for even granting that at any period any single member of the confederacy should need peculiar assistance, its constant contribution to the Imperial exchequer would in the end more than outweigh the temporary obligation. . . .

Measures of Imperial, national, or Colonial importance are hustled out of the way by one or two, sometimes, of secondary consequence, which have happened to engage popular sympathies. Here is the secret of Ministerial worship of Drift. Some of the most crying evils of the day retain their vicious power, some of the most needful reforms are unaccomplished, because there are limits to legislative time and human endurance. If this pressure continues in anything like the present ratio of increase, the Empire must perish of congestion of the brain. . . .

It is worth while to observe the discrepancy between the numbers arising out of the three kingdoms. The proportion of English statutes is too largely in excess of those from Scotland and Ireland to be accounted for simply by the disproportion of population, wealth, and prosperity. It must be taken that from either of the lesser provinces there would, in the event of greater legislative facilities, be more