

and the other the *remedy*. Let Hortensius observe, that I am speaking of the *doctrine* of suspension and its effects, not of the character and principles of some very respectable persons, who, in an unguarded hour, seemed to give it their sanction. I have no doubt, that upon an application from the electors, *they* would have restored them to the rights of representation. But I say, that in other hands, this power might subvert the constitution, though I am certain, that *worthy* men would attend to the desire of the constituent; yet it is not to be supposed *in general*, that the men who offer an injury, are therefore likely to redress it. The successors of this Parliament may adopt the practice of *suspending*, and may not give ear to those who complain of the suspension; they may alledge——“Suspension is a *constitutional idea*, the electors are not aggrieved; the Parliament of 1772 would not have set us an example of any thing unconstitutional; to recal our act, would be to condemn that Parliament and ourselves; for if we admit, that the electors *suffer* an injury, we cannot deny, but that we are the men who have *injured*.”—Let Hortensius reflect, that a corrupt majority in Parliament is no ideal danger; that the only remedy lies in the appeal to the constituent. If the House can expel and *disqualify*, a majority may get rid of every *troublesome* or *able* opponent; but still others will come in, in their room, and a *defection* amongst