

The English had, in 1726, by a treaty made on September 14, and which Governor Pownall prints in his *Administration of the Colonies*, secured a fresh recognition by the Iroquois of their guardianship over them. By this compact the Senecas, Cayugas and Onondagas, falling in with the concessions of the Mohawks and Oneidas in 1684, surrendered a tract from Oswego to Caynhoga (Cleveland), with an extent inland of sixty miles.

A score of years and more passed thereafter before the French became fully sensible that they must forcibly contest their claim to the Ohio. By this time their plan had fully ripened of connecting Canada and Louisiana by a chain of posts, and of keeping the English on the seaward side of the Alleghanies. In this, they were convinced, lay a riper future for New France rather than in crossing the Mississippi and disputing sovereignty with the Spaniard. This accomplished, they hoped to offer a barrier against the English effective enough to prevent their wresting from Spain the silver mines beyond the Mississippi.

The French had always claimed priority on the Ohio, and when Céloron was sent in 1749 to take formal possession along its banks, by hanging royal insignia on trees and burying graven plates in the soil, that officer professedly made "a *renewal* of possession of the Ohio and all its affluents,"—a possession originally established "by arms and treaties, particularly those of Ryswick, Utrecht and Aix-la-Chapelle." There was urgency for such a "renewal," for Céloron found that the English were already in possession of the country, so far as the friendly sanction of the natives signified it. Thus the Iroquois claim to that extent had proved effective, and Colden has distinctly expounded it in his *History of the Five Nations*. It was also clearly traced in maps by Jefferys in 1753, and by Mitchell and Huske in 1755.

It was, therefore, a necessity for the French to use force if they were to make good their claims by holding the