

slow, and each advance was purchased at a fearful cost of men, treasure, and morale. On the whole Italy worked out her own salvation. England lent her a lofty and spasmodic patronage; Austria thrice fought her; Napoleon III helped her to Lombardy in 1859, but either discouraged or positively vetoed her acquisition of Venetia, Central Italy, and Rome; Prussia gave her Venetia in 1866 to purchase her assistance against Austria, but forced a peace upon her which left the Trentino and Istria, which were essentially Italian territory, still in Austrian hands. Only the accident of the Franco-Prussian War allowed Italy to make Rome her capital so early as 1870.

One feeling above all was inherited from this period of struggle: it was a deep-rooted and a well-justified suspicion and dislike of France. The Emperor Napoleon III had used Italy for his own purposes against Austria, but he had no intention of creating a strong national State on his southern frontiers. For the limited assistance he gave, he took as his price the province of Savoy and the district of Nice, and though he was forced by the intensity of national feeling to allow Italy to take the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the Duchies of Parma and Modena, and the bulk of the Papal States in 1861, he firmly vetoed the occupation of Rome itself. At his insistence and by his help Garibaldi's dash on Rome was frustrated at Mentana, and under the French clerical influence he maintained a garrison in Rome till 1870. It was small wonder that his appeal to Victor Emmanuel for help against Germany fell on deaf ears: it is certain that the whole generation of Italians who had lived through the years of emancipation retained a dislike of France that vitally affected later history. Another motive, also, gave impetus to this hostility.