

weapons option, and signatories of the treaty have clearly indicated that they expect assistance on a preferential basis in the application of nuclear technology.

Article V establishes the principle that potential benefits from any peaceful application of nuclear explosions should be made available at the lowest possible cost to non-nuclear parties. The impossibility of distinguishing between nuclear weapons and "other nuclear explosive devices", which are also under prohibition, made it necessary for the nuclear powers to guarantee the availability of the benefits from such techniques.

Article VI confirms that parties to the treaty intend to negotiate in good faith on effective measures towards cessation of the nuclear arms race and towards nuclear disarmament. For reasons which I shall explain in a few minutes, we consider the implications of this article in the context of strategic arms talks to be one of the key considerations in bringing this treaty into force and in further progress of negotiations on arms control when the Eighteen Nation Committee reconvenes in March.

The treaty will enter into force when it has been ratified by the three depositary governments and 40 other signatories. Provision is made for its operation to be reviewed at intervals of five years during its current life of 25 years.

Speaking before a local men's group in mid-October, I expressed concern that the Non-Proliferation Treaty should not become a victim of the recent events in Czechoslovakia. Since that time, several more countries have signed the treaty, bringing the total to 85, and four countries have ratified. There appears to be growing recognition that, unless the non-proliferation treaty is brought into force soon, an increasing number of countries may conclude that it is in their national interest to "go nuclear". It is necessary, but disturbing, to acknowledge that only two of the "near nuclear" powers—Canada and Sweden—have signed the treaty. Such critical countries as West Germany, Israel, India, Japan, Australia and others have not signed because of dissatisfaction with the security assurances associated with the treaty and for a variety of other reasons. The case for Canadian leadership seems to me unmistakably clear. The Canadian Government is doing everything it can to ensure that this new step forward in arms control does not revert to a step backward into distrust and nuclear proliferation. The nuclear club has increased from one to five in less than two decades. There must be no new members.

29234—54

Not only must the dissemination of nuclear capability be proscribed; we must now undertake the obligation assumed by parties to the treaty to negotiate measures to halt the nuclear arms race. We have argued that a basic requirement in this regard is the initiation of strategic armaments limitations talks between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Without progress in this field, there appears to be little prospect of an effective NPT, a halt to nuclear testing or agreement on further arms control and disarmament measures. The NPT is but one step in the right direction. We must now bend our efforts to the limitation and eventual reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles, and the destruction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. One of the most important arms control resolutions adopted by the session of the United Nations General Assembly, which concluded in December, called for talks on strategic arms limitations to commence at an early date. Within the Eighteen National Disarmament Committee and the UNGA, Canadian representatives must continue to build on the base formed by the Partial Test Ban, the Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the NPT. These important accomplishments encourage us to hope that the security of nations can be assured, and that the objective of the United Nations in maintaining peace is possible of attainment.

I felt that I would be remiss in my duty if I did not call to the attention of the Senate the announcement made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the dying days of the session before the Christmas recess, and if I did not indicate the interest and the concern of this house in so vital a matter as this one.

Hon. Senators: Hear, hear.

Hon. M. Grattan O'Leary: Honourable senators, I have not had an opportunity to consider the statement just given to us by the Leader of the Government, and of course I have not seen the treaty itself. As the leader said towards the close of his statement, this of course is a step in the right direction, but I think it would be a tragic mistake if any of us in this house or in this nation or any other nation were induced into a state of euphoria by what has been accomplished, as given to us by the leader.

What we are doing here is giving our opinion that it would be a good thing to discontinue the spread of nuclear weapons, and that is a right opinion. However, honourable senators, if tomorrow we stop the spread of