

It will be useful at this stage to suggest what are the driving factors which push the two countries currently, and to some extent expand on those mentioned so far as doing so, where nuclear weapons programmes are concerned. We will then go on to see how one might in perhaps limited ways counter such drives, emphasizing the Argentine-Brazilian experience.

India - Driving Factors

Four factors govern India's perception of regional and global security issues: history, geopolitics, internal politics and regional conflict. From New Delhi's perspective, history is the largest single driving factor in India's quest for nuclear weapons. India's colonial legacy, coloured by three centuries of rather paternalistic imperial governance, may well be a major engine driving India's desire for recognition as a nascent global power. That legacy has, in a sense, been exacerbated by the manner in which Independence led to internecine conflict, Partition and strife rather than promised prosperity. Nuclear weapons are one more piece of a mosaic that includes the development of first-rate educational institutions, the drive for a naval power-projection capability, the quest for nation-wide industrialization and the development of an indigenous space programme.

These are perceived to be the measures of First World or "Great Power" status, and New Delhi considers that these achievements merit recognition of India as a global player. In this context, India's nuclear capability is in part an attempt to redress perceived technological inferiority. It is in great measure for this reason that India's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability has consistently received such a high level of public support.

The second problem complicating the puzzle is China, with whom India has twice gone to war. The Indian nuclear programme took its first significant steps following China's 1964 and 1967 tests, respectively, of first-generation and thermonuclear weapons, and that programme was accelerated when it became clear, with the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the late 1960s, that China would be the last nation to "slip in through the door" as a "legal" Nuclear Weapons State. Among India's neighbours, only China has had the motive and the means to pose a significant conventional threat to Indian security and while that does mean that its tests were mere reactions to China, it does mean they were an answer to the series of factors discussed above, of which a major element was China.

The third problem complicating the Indian side of the equation is the nature of India's internal political structure. At any one time, the *Lok Sabha* is a maze of conflicting parties, priorities and interests. Coalition politics and compromise are the order of the day, with the result that governments, when they eventually take power, may be so hobbled by partisan interests that little can be accomplished, and so unstable that the outbreak of minor discord can bring a government down. The decline of India's political institutions, interestingly, has been matched by a rise in grass-