

for conflict resolution. Thus, information-gathering and analysis for early warning should be seen in the spectrum of the Secretary-General's activities. Because there is so much overlap in the information requirements, it would be efficient make early warning a mandate of a larger information/intelligence unit under the Secretary-General.

In certain circumstances, usually after an act of aggression has occurred and the Security Council has imposed sanctions, the Secretary-General may play a role in monitoring or supervision. For example, he was tasked with helping the UN Special Commission in its monitoring of the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Finally, the UN often maintains humanitarian and development aid in a peace-building effort aimed at maintaining the infrastructures (e.g., educational, economic, and social) that are necessary to maintain peace.

A list of conflicts in which the Secretary-General has intervened has been prepared¹⁶ and his roles analyzed with the above framework. It shows that in the first fifty years of the UN, the number of early warning cases is fewer than five percent of conflicts handled. In addition to the examples of the Congo (1960) and East Pakistan/Bangladesh (1971) mentioned above, there are the cases of Bahrain (1970) and Macedonia (1992). In both these latter cases, as it turns out, effective preventive action was also taken.

The record shows that early warning is not a frequent activity of the UN Secretary-General, despite his Charter mandate. It is therefore natural to identify the difficulties associated with early warning and to explore the possibilities for improvements. Especially after the Cold War, one would expect that an expansion of the Secretary-General's role in this area would be both desirable and possible.

III. Old Constraints and New Opportunities

The dilemma faced by a Secretary-General before warning of a new threat to the peace is much like that faced by a person wondering whether to pull a fire alarm. As the signs of fire appear, a number of people are usually in a position to sound the alarm. In the UN, member states also have the right to bring threats to the peace to the attention of the Council.¹⁷ To sound the alarm, the Secretary-General must either have new and unique information on the danger or, once the danger is seen by several actors, he must be bold enough to choose to quickly raise the issue. The two main reasons for the dearth of warnings from the Secretary-General are pinpointed in this analogy. He rarely has more information than the most powerful members of the UN (or states closest to the conflict) and, when a conflict becomes obvious, he often