

North America, working through co-operating national governments, could provide a nucleus of military strength, economic prosperity and political stability, round which a global balance could be re-established and the extension by force of aggressive Communist imperialism be stopped. We did not know at that time whether this would be possible at all. We did not know, whether, if it were possible, it would take, five, ten, 20 or 50 years to accomplish. We certainly cannot even say today that it has been accomplished. But we have reached a kind of provisional framework – an equilibrium – in which we can live together, both we and the Communist states in Europe, with a hope for progress to something better than mere co-existence.

Indeed, some of our troubles today are the results of our successes in these recent years. In 1948 we were anxious and frightened – with cause – at the threatened extension westward of totalitarian Communism, into those European countries which, while still free, were badly shaken in their political confidence and almost completely disrupted in their economic life. After the war, our problems were of immediate, not ultimate survival. But today we are concerned with longer-range problems of peace, of prosperity, of development. This is a measure of our progress.

Once the course of history has been changed, even a little, we are prone to look back and regard that change as inevitable. But in 1945, as we looked ahead, there seemed nothing inevitable or certain about the reconstruction of a democratic, prosperous, independent Western Europe that was to take place. There seemed nothing inevitable about a change in the old American habit of peacetime isolation, which had been dominant for 150 years. It was far from inevitable that countries, who had never in peacetime pooled any part of their sovereignty, would do so now and together organize a collective defence that, in the conditions of the modern world, might prove effective enough to deter another war. We were up against physical destruction, economic stagnation and political defeatism. Vast human and material resources had been blown away and destroyed in war. Out of this waste and weariness could we really construct something new that might help to meet and solve our problems?

#### DISCONTENT WITH NATO

Well – it was done. Gradually, hesitantly, painfully, but steadily, things were done. An alliance that was designed to be more than military was welded together in peacetime. Its members began to believe in the possibility of a secure peace – of a good life. Indeed, as the years went by, many even began to forget or ignore the continuing dangers of a yet more horrible war. So they became impatient with the structures and the processes that had made their own comfortable conclusions possible. They – some people and some governments – began to fall back into those historic nationalist grooves which had been the source of so much of the bloodshed and conflict and chaos they had recently endured. With recovery came also impatience and doubt and some distrust.

We should have seen this happening in the Atlantic alliance and countered it. In December 1964, Canada proposed in NATO a reassessment of the nature of the alliance in the light of these changing conditions. Little was done....

We should have acted earlier and not under the compulsion of events. We should have tried to move forward together to a closer international association in order to remove the risk of sliding backwards. In these matters, there is no standing still....

If there is anything that has been made crystal clear by the grim experience of half a century, it is that neither peace nor security nor prosperity can be achieved or maintained by national action alone – or by national policy alone.

So this is no time to weaken in our support for the NATO alliance, because it is having difficulties. We must solve these difficulties. But we must not stop there. We must move forward with new resolve toward an international community with common political institutions, which covers more than a single continent and spans the Atlantic.

#### MILITARY BOND INSUFFICIENT

It must also be more than a military alliance. Try as we might, we have never been able to make NATO much more than that. An alliance for defence only, however, is an anachronism in the world of 1966, especially when nuclear power is not shared, by possession or by control, among its members.... A guarantee of nuclear support against aggression simply does not have the credibility that would make it a fully effective deterrent and therefore a guarantee of security.

I repeat, we must develop common, unifying political institutions which would provide for collective foreign and economic policies, as well as genuinely collective defence. Nothing less will be adequate to meet today's challenge of jets and rockets and hydrogen bombs....

#### DANGER OF DISCOURAGEMENT

In 1940, Britain – only a few years before cool and confident behind its channel – proposed full union with France. It was the moment when continental Europe was about to fall victim to the Nazi aggressor. The offer was too late. Offers made under the imminence of defeat and collapse, for radical and immediate action to implement ideas which the day before yesterday were considered as visionary and unrealistic – such offers always are too late. Do we have to have panic before we can make progress?

At this moment, moreover, a feeling of discouragement is more likely to work in the wrong way – not in the transformation of NATO into something better but in its reduction into something less. This is a very real danger. French policy has underlined it.

General de Gaulle has rejected Atlantic defence integration. He has ordered France's withdrawal from the North Atlantic defence organization. In doing so, his procedures have been brusque and his ideas understandably disturbing to France's friends and allies.

It would be foolish, however, to push the panic-button over this. By doing so, we might merely push