

should be possible to provide overhead imagery collected from military satellites with its resolution degraded to the level being achieved by contemporary commercial satellites and aerial photography, and to make available much of the intelligence assembled from study of open sources.

The most difficult problem in achieving effective synergy may come from bureaucratic resistance to the establishment of an adequate agency for synthesis and analysis. It could be regarded as unwanted competition by the already established intelligence agencies, lest it draw off some of their funding, talented personnel, secrets, and power. But without a competent analysis agency the opportunities for effective verification, let alone synergy, will never be exploited.

Verification of multilateral arms control agreements provides an international dimension to the exploitation of synergy at an organizational level. In the case of intelligence, the formation of military alliances has offered the opportunity for synergy, both for collection and for analysis. Geographic location gives some countries a particularly advantageous opportunity for collection of information, both strategic and tactical, regarding the activities of a powerful neighbour. The thorough understanding of a particular country needed for accurate analysis is most likely to be possessed by a neighbour familiar with the language and maintaining an active cross-border intercommunication. Therefore a pooling of both sources and analysis should produce an improved product. In practice, the cooperation in exchange of intelligence among countries has been graduated according to the closeness of the alliance, and has produced most benefits for the smaller members. However, reticence to share the products of NTM is still present.

The case should be somewhat different for multilateral verification, and quite possibly complicated by local bilateral antagonisms. The quotas for on-site inspections and aerial overflights are likely to be based on the number of declared sites, without regard for the relative locations of inspecting and inspected parties. Synergy should be achieved by a systematic allocation of inspections among allied partners, arranging for them to be carried out by the countries most knowledgeable of the equipment, forces, and customary behaviour of the country being visited. If all inspections are to be restricted to using the same sensors, there should be no reluctance to full sharing of the data obtained by them.

So far, verification has been organized in terms of the relevant treaties for arms control, with no interaction affording opportunities for synergy among regimes. However, the number of regional groups and international regimes and agencies now involved to a greater or lesser extent in multilateral arms control is considerable. Regional groups include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC),\* the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Western European Union (WEU), the European Community, and the Organization for the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL). International Organizations include the United Nations and agencies created by it, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, the Australia Group, the Zangger Committee, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. As described in the following section, some of the treaties have created bodies to implement the agreements.

\* The membership of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council consists of members of NATO, the former Warsaw Pact and successor states of the former U.S.S.R.

