

## BEYOND.

Beyond life's lull and ebb,  
Its hopes and joys, its weariness and sorrow,  
Its sleepless nights, its days of smiles and tears,  
Will be a long sweet life, unmarked by years,  
One bright unending morrow.

Beyond times troubled afloat,  
Beyond the chilling waves of death's dark river  
Beyond life's lowering clouds and fitful gleams,  
Its dark realities and brighter dreams,  
A beautiful forever.

No aching hearts are there,  
No tear-dimmed eye, no form by sickness wasted,  
No cheek grown pale through penury or care,  
No spirits crushed beneath the woes they bear,  
No sighs for bliss untasted.

No sad farewell is heard  
No lonely wail for loving ones departed,  
No dark remorse is there, or memories sturred,  
No smile of scorn, no laugh or cruel word  
To grieve the broken-hearted.

No long dark night is there,  
No light from sun or sliver moon is given  
But Christ, the Lamb of God, all bright and fair,  
Illumes the city with effulgent care,  
The glorious light of heaven.

No mortal eye hath seen  
The glories of that land beyond the river,  
Its crystal lakes, its fields of living green,  
Its fadeless flowers and the unchanging sheen,  
Around the throne forever.

Ear hath not heard the song  
Of rapturous praise within that shining portal;  
No heart of man hath dreamed what joys become  
To that redeemed and happy blood washed  
through  
All glorious and immortal.

## THE STUDY OF NAVAL TACTICS.

The act of doing one thing at a time, and doing that thing well, is the foundation of all success. In scientific parlance, it is known as specialisation. But specialisation may become a craze, and then it is somewhat injurious, and more especially when communities and nations indulge in it, either in a fit of imitative zeal, or a burst of reorganizing enthusiasm, or a mode of something like half-conscious despair. It may exhaust our energy, and reduce us to the one-eyed condition of the companions in the "Arabian Nights." It may distract our attention from matters of more pressing importance in other spheres of labour and activity. If time were of no consequence, this pursuit of excellence in one direction might have no great disadvantages, but time is frequently of more importance to nations than it is to individuals; and whilst one is losing itself in special development, another is profiting by the opportunity to excel in some more vital qualities, which are special because national, and national because indispensable. If an inhabitant of another planet—or, say, Voltaire's Micromegas from the Dog Star—were to visit Great Britain just now, he would be struck by our military fervour, and by the immense importance we attach to military history and military tactics. "Surely this is a military nation, *par excellence*," he would say to himself, "wholly dependent for its existence upon its Army, with frontiers only to be defended by troops, and justly excited by everything connected with the Franco-German war, with its strategy, its tactics, and its wonderful revelations of order, discipline, and precision." We have assumed that his descent were made in the middle of England, and that he was as yet unacquainted with our island condition, with the existence of our fleet, our maritime supremacy, and our colonies. As soon as he had become acquainted with our real geographical character, with our immense harbours, our fleet, and our comparative inattention to naval matters, he could fancy him exclaiming, "Surely, the people are mad! Germany and France may wisely devote themselves to military improvements, to thorough reorgan-

ization, and to whatever concerns the *sine qua non* of their existence. But Great Britain is mainly dependent on her fleet, and it is this she has to perfect, to make the central object of her study, and to develop in every way in accordance with the best ideas and most advanced modes of the day. Her fighting literature ought to be more naval than military, and the books to be met everywhere ought not to be German studies on tactics, but English studies on naval tactics. Here she ought to lead, and not to follow. But this absorption, this Germanism, bids fair to ruin her. The people are beside themselves, and, Micromegas, you had better return to your Dog Star!" Would there be no justice in such observations? Is it not a fact that we are far too much absorbed in what is little less than a far-off imitation of Germany? Are not the great fighting books, in everybody's hands, almost exclusively of the military type? And does it not seem as if we were in the mood to build big ships, and let mere bridding of them suffice? Look at the florid descriptions in the newspapers whenever a new monster is projected; look at the attention given to armour plates and immense guns; look at the annual "exhibitions" in our ports, when the Channel Fleet makes its summer cruise, and everything degenerates into an enormous aquatic picnic. Then, to complete the picture, hunt up the few standard books dealing with naval tactics: refer to the mishaps which happen to our ironclads when out for a cruise, and see how this mania for "soldiering" has crept even into our naval manuals, our naval reviews, and even into our warships, where the fighting men look askance on the navigating men, and make no secret of their conviction of personal superiority! What is all this but absurd specialisation? It is true we are reorganizing the Army, and endeavouring to bring it up to a more modern standard. It was impossible for us to escape from the fascinations of a great war, and we read its literature as eagerly as our fathers read "Waverley." We have much to learn and much to forget; we must make our small forces compact and perfect as money, time, and genius can make it. But why should we seem to neglect our Navy, to imagine that mere additions and novelties are all we require, and to consent to being in such a backward state in everything that concerns its scientific evolution at sea, and the best use of its enormous attacking power? We have had no great war, since the American one, to arouse us into extraordinary activity, but we have gone on building without a proper sense of other responsibilities, and without completing a good system of naval tactics, such as we ought to complete, with the means at our disposal, and with the element all around us which makes our fleet necessary, and in which we may one day have to fight, not for supremacy, but for existence. It is clearly our duty to do for naval tactics what the Germans have done for military tactics; and to the question whether we have done it, we can only return, if we are honest, a very melancholy answer.

In this state of affairs, we heartily welcome an article in the current number of the *Edinburgh Review* on "Ocean Warfare," in which our shortcomings are suggested, whilst our progress is detailed. The writer aims to be more expository than suggestive, but he very properly insists upon the further study and development of naval tactics, under the revolutionary conditions brought about by steam, armour plates, heavy guns, rams, and torpedoes. He shows, clearly enough, that, ordinarily, the old system was a mere cannonade, and that we were, in the eighteenth century, almost as negligent and contemp-

tuous in the matter of tactics as we are now, whilst the French were our superiors, and frequently outmanoeuvred us at sea. But Nelson was a great tactician, and he worked out his problems of destruction as if he were doing Euclid at school. Steam has made all the difference, but the difference has not been fully seized and worked out. What has been done has almost as narrow and restricted as what seemed possible when shells and steam came to have their present place and power. An old writer—at least old in a naval sense, though he was only writing between 1830-40—gives us some amusing remarks. He is writing about bombs, and he says that when their use should become common, "it would seem that the naval profession would cease to be very desirable. Nevertheless, experience has, in all ages, shown that, the more it is improved and systematised, the less is the loss of life." Steam, he thinks, would end in fighting ships being smaller in size, but "the bomb cannon, mounted on steamers, which can take their place at will," would be most formidable for coast defence. The idea of using them in any other way did not occur to him. We have given this quotation merely to show the root fallacy of early steam Navy tactics, namely, that ships can "take their place at will." The reviewer shows how this notion led to early mistakes, and how recently we have shook ourselves clean of them. The question of turning a steamship at sea is a very simple one, but its very simplicity is deceptive, and caused all the mistakes of early naval evolutions of the steamship school. Admiral Boutakoo, a Russian investigator, and one of the first writers on the subject, maintained that the difference between the actual figure described by a ship in turning, and the theoretical circle of reversion, "was not of sufficient importance to invalidate the system of evolutions based on the idea of a true circular path." His authority remained unquestioned for some time, and it was not until Commander Leval, of the French Navy, published his "Principles of Naval Evolution" that the true path was described. The work of Sir Howard Douglas was published when the ironclad ram was still a novelty, but his suggestions received no official recognition, and attracted but little attention in the Navy itself. Admiral Sir William Martin, who made his Mediterranean command famous by his revision of the old evolutions in force in the three-decker sailing system, comes next into prominence. His book was the basis of the tactics at present in use, according to the confession of Captain Colomb, to whom the work was entrusted. But this system, says the reviewer, is "a basis or foundation, on which the new tactics might rest, rather than a real tactical system." We have yet to elaborate a thorough and efficient naval tactic, and an approving notice is given of some prize essays, written for a competition opened by the Junior Naval Professional Association at Portsmouth, in which there are obvious indications of progress and study. The essayists were—Commander Noel, Mr. Loughton, of Greenwich, and Lieutenants Campbell. The essays are pleasing indications of what may be done by a little zeal and hard thinking. But their real interest is in showing us how much we have to do.

We ought not to rest satisfied with anything short of the unquestioned pre-eminence suggested in our opening remarks. It is our will and pleasure to solve the question of arm-our versus guns, and it is equally our duty to cultivate the study of naval tactics, to raise it from a dry to an attractive branch of professional life, and to seize every opportunity of practically applying new and old principles in experimental cruises, devoted to