the ratification of the present convention, or subsequent to that date, new agreements, general or special, with a view of extending the obligation to submit controversies to arbitration, to all cases which they consider suitable for such submission.

And it is along those lines that for the present we must look for signs of progress. The most positive result of the Second Hague Conference was a resolution accepted by all the Powers not to resort to hostilities for the enforcement of contractural debts without first submitting any disputed claim to arbitration. A year before the second conference at The Hague a remarkable treaty was arranged between Norway and Sweden. The Treaty of Karlstad, perhaps because it was between sister nations, has attracted less attention than might have been expected. None the less it represents a great advance upon anything which had gone before. It provides that all disputes not touching the vital interests of either country should be referred to the Hague court, and—this is the important clause—the question whether a given question does in fact affect the vital interests of either country was to be decided, not by the parties themselves, but by the court.

As the immediate result of the second conference at The Hague, a whole group of treaties providing for arbitration under certain conditions was negotiated. The 1908 treaty between England and the United States belonged to a common type—easy to arrange and of little practical value when arranged. It was a poor compensation for the loss of the Olney-Pauncefote agreement. That at least would have secured arbitration for all possible causes of quarrel between the two countries, even if it did not in all cases offer the prospect of a certain and binding decision. The treaty of 1908 merely provides that,

> Differences which may arise of a legal nature or relating to the interpretation of treaties . . . . shall be referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration established at The Hague by the Convention of the 29th of July, 1899, provided, nevertheless, that they do not affect the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the two contracting States.

The scope of the second treaty had been indefinitely contracted, and, except as a sort of diplomatic germ out of which something better might develop, it was almost valueless. For the difference between the two treaties was vital. The first renounced the immediate right to appeal to arms, and bound both parties to submit their quarrels. whatever their nature, to