

limited area. They had suggested Germany. The difficulty with Germany of course is that such enormous forces, both military and political, are involved and the issues are so critical that neither side is prepared for boldness. In the Middle East, however, although the situation is critical, it is nevertheless peripheral. At any rate, the armed forces involved are relatively small and the nations to be controlled relatively weak and without their own armament industries. A good deal of careful study would have to be given to such a proposal before it could be put forward, but is perhaps worthy of examination.

9. The idea of inviting the Russians to work out an agreed settlement is not one which is likely to be received warmly if it were put forward to the State Department or the Foreign Office. However, it is the kind of large gesture which might appeal to President Eisenhower. It would be in harmony with the kind of thinking he has shown in his letters to Bulganin and might even be included in his next correspondence with the Marshal. Even if it was not taken up by the Russians, such a gesture would have a tonic effect on the morale of the West, which is at a very low ebb. The peoples of the Western countries are not only discouraged, they are doubtful and confused about the rightness of the Western position in Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Cyprus and North Africa. The notes of protest being sounded recently by President Gronchi and M. Pineau are fair warning of the impatience generally felt with Anglo-American leadership. If the U.S. and the U.K. are to preserve their position of leadership (and however much we argue against an arrogant use of that position it is nevertheless in our interests to preserve it) they must produce new ideas, new conceptions, gestures of faith rather than merely re-hashing tired old clichés about Soviet policy. It is not good enough to go on talking about Soviet intentions never changing without probing the indications that the Russians are interested in striking bargains to assure a peaceful framework for co-existence.

10. If the Russians accepted a straightforward offer from President Eisenhower to reach agreement on a Middle Eastern settlement, and if the negotiations were to be at least as successful as those on Indo-China, then a step of incalculable significance might have been taken. From this agreement on one major issue we might proceed to establish a firmer basis for co-existence. (The danger is recognized that an effort of this kind which failed would probably leave the situation worse than it was before.) If the Russians refused the offer, then at any rate the moral position of the West would be considerably strengthened. (Although it must also be recognized that the Russians are masters of the art of accepting with unacceptable conditions which put the other side apparently in the wrong.)

11. This disorganized memorandum is intended merely to provoke further consideration. I have not even tried to suggest the basis of any settlement with the Russians, nor have I dealt with the extremely difficult problems of how any such negotiations would take place, whether they would be within a United Nations framework, or whether they would include the parties to the dispute. All these things are not mere details but matters which could prove to be insuperable obstacles. It would seem useful, however, to have the idea critically examined by those concerned within the Department. If, perchance, we can make something of it, it might be that the suggestion could be conveyed to the President direct at White Sulphur Springs.⁸

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⁸ Voir Volume 23, Chapitre premier, 1^{ère} partie.

See Volume 23, Chapter 1, Part 1.