

The Address—Mr. Rowe

to stay. Britain, France and Israel should not be asked to withdraw their troops without any guarantee of the settlement of the Suez question and not until Egypt reaches a permanent political settlement with Israel. They should not be asked to move out of the Near East until an effective police force is established, which was a condition of the cease-fire agreement.

The Nasser government has made considerable headway towards turning a military defeat into a political victory. This has been made possible by the unfair criticism and the unnecessary compromises of the United Nations and, I might say, by our Canadian statesmen and those of the United States.

Mr. Ferguson: Who said he is a statesman?

Mr. Rowe: They have encouraged our enemies and so embarrassed our friends. Now President Nasser insists upon what would in effect be a return to the political status before the invasion. President Nasser regards the United Nations police force solely as an instrument to force the invaders to go home. Surely it was never proposed for any such purpose.

This house and the country are entitled to know if they are only going to police the evacuation of British and French troops and then move out when demanded by President Nasser. If the United Nations yields to this request, our troops should not leave Canada because such a plan would be likely to do more harm than good.

Russia's objective is, and has been all along, to exploit this crisis and to carve out a position for itself in the Middle East. The recent action that the United Nations has taken was not, as in the case of Korea, by a decision of the veto-bound Security Council but on the recommendation of the General Assembly backed by some three-score nations, including the United States. It used the last reserve power that the United Nations has and that makes it vitally important that it must not fail now if it is going to live effectively in the future.

But what are the results by which success or failure may be judged? The immediate mission is to prevent the further outbreak of war, of course, but this is of no use in itself alone. What is the use of Britain and France agreeing to a cease-fire or a withdrawal of troops with no assurance or guarantee of a settlement in the Middle East? What is the use of Israel withdrawing troops if Russia is to be free at any time to put its power behind Egypt and the Arab world, who collectively boast they will wipe

out the state of Israel and eliminate all British and French influence in the whole Suez region and Mediterranean area?

If our Canadian troops are to be used as part of UN police forces, it is our duty to see that they are given a possible function toward a sound objective. We must never ask them merely to clear a course and police a route for Colonel Nasser and his Russian comrades to pursue quietly and cunningly toward the diabolical purpose they have so boldly emphasized.

During the last session of parliament repeated requests were made by the opposition for information on Canada's interest in the Mediterranean crisis. Such requests were made by the hon. member for Prince Albert and others. Such requests produced only evasive answers from the Prime Minister and from the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Despite our membership in the commonwealth, in the United Nations and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, we were willing to allow a solution to the crisis to be worked out at one of the conferences called in London. When asked particularly whether Canada's official stand followed the United Kingdom and France or the United States, the Secretary of State for External Affairs on August 6, so reported at page 7047 of *Hansard*, said this:

I must also deprecate, in a friendly way, the implication of my hon. friend's question that there is necessarily any difference of policy in this matter between the United States on the one hand and the United Kingdom and France on the other. I hope that at the conference in question the three governments will be able to work closely together and that at this conference, as in all other matters—and this is a question of the most vital importance to Canada—the closest co-operation inside the commonwealth and the closest co-operation between the United Kingdom and the United States will be reflected once again.

At that date, as evidence that the government had certainly not given careful consideration to the policy to be followed if the Suez canal crisis increased, there is the statement made by the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney) on August 3 in Vancouver:

This is primarily a European matter. It is not a matter which particularly concerns Canada. We have no oil there. We don't use the canal for shipping.

Surely we may say that this was a most disturbing and unsatisfactory attitude on the government's part when a crisis threatening the very peace of the world had burst upon us. Since the government apparently failed to take note of international political realities, perhaps I may briefly summarize the international factors which should have led them to reach a clear decision on where Canada's